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INTRODUCTION
In Hazelwood School District v. United States, the Supreme Court
considered the hiring practices of a Missouri school district after a teacher
alleged that the district had engaged in a “pattern or practice” of
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 1

1. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 (1977). A “pattern or
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Prior to the Supreme Court’s review, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri, determining whether the school district
discriminated against teachers on the basis of their inclusion in a protected
class, did not examine the availability of qualified individuals in the
relevant labor market. 2 Instead, the district court considered the percentage
of students within the protected class that were in the local school district
and compared them to the percentage of teachers in the same protected
class that were employed by the district. 3 The court concluded that the
school district had not violated Title VII because the low proportion of
teachers in the protected class mirrored the low proportion of students in
the protected class in the student body. 4 On appeal, the Supreme Court
determined that the district court’s analysis was incorrect, finding that the
demographic comparison of students and teachers was “irrelevant” to a
finding of discriminatory intent. 5
Undoubtedly, in the context of establishing the discriminatory intent
of a systemic disparate treatment case, the Supreme Court’s approach was
the more logically coherent analysis. Because student demographics of a
school district do not necessarily correlate with the demographics of
available teacher candidates, as the disparity may be the result of factors
besides employer discrimination, it would be incorrect to infer
discriminatory intent based simply upon a comparison of the teacher and
student populations. Since Hazelwood, a number of Supreme Court cases
have established that the appropriate inquiry in some discrimination cases
involves a comparison of the proportion of employees in the protected class
and the proportion of qualified individuals in the protected class in the
relevant labor market. 6 However, the district court’s analysis that

practice” case exists where a defendant-employer regularly engages in acts that deprive
individuals of the full enjoyment of their Title VII non-discrimination rights; Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977). Under the Teamsters framework, the
plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing that the unlawful discrimination was a regular
procedure or policy utilized by the employer. The plaintiff is not charged with proving the
employer’s discriminatory intent. If the plaintiff satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the
employer to prove that the plaintiff was denied the employment opportunity for lawful
reasons. Id. at 336.
2. United States v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1287 (E.D. Mo. 1975)
rev’d and remanded, 534 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1976) vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 299
(1977).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 311 (agreeing with the Court of Appeals that the
comparison should be made to the relevant labor market, but remanding the case to district
court to determine that market).
6. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1989)
(acknowledging that it is the “comparison-between the racial composition of the qualified
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compared the student population to the demographic composition of their
teachers raises interesting questions about an educational hiring system that
follows this approach. This approach would allow school districts to hire
certain individuals in an attempt to reflect the protected class identities of
their student body. This idea illustrates that although comparing the
protected classes of educators and their students may be “irrelevant” in the
context of establishing a systemic disparate treatment prima facie case, this
relationship is anything but irrelevant when the overlap of protected classes
is considered in the context of the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) exemption and the possible impact that demographic convergence
could have on academic achievement.
This comment will explore the relationship of the same-sex BFOQ
defense and its possible application in the educational sphere. Part I has
served as an introduction to the material, exploring the general concepts
that are at play in the context of employment discrimination and systemic
disparate treatment cases. Part II of the comment explores the statutory
provisions of Title VII that are relevant to the BFOQ analysis and,
additionally, delves into the Supreme Court and lower courts’ reading of
the same-sex BFOQ standard. In Part III, the comment identifies the lower
courts’ acceptance of a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ, illuminating the
courts’ inconsistent treatment of the defense as well as its conceptual
overlap with other same-sex BFOQs. Part IV explains the logical
consistency behind the establishment of a standalone role-modeling BFOQ,
which does not lie in combination with other same-sex BFOQs.
Additionally, Part IV culminates in an explanation of the potential impact
of the role-modeling BFOQ’s application in the context of educational
institutions. Finally, Part V summarizes the findings of the comment and
considers the future of same-sex BFOQs in the educational sphere.

persons in the labor market and the persons holding at-issue jobs-that generally forms the
proper basis for the initial inquiry in a disparate-impact case”); Johnson v. Transp. Agency,
Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 632 (1987) (finding that an employer’s affirmative
action program for a special skill position would be justified if the employer demonstrates a
manifest imbalance in their workforce, which can be proved through a comparison of the
positions that demand special training and those in the labor force who possess the relevant
qualifications); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 56 (1984) (considering the parties’
arguments concerning the relevant labor market in a Title VII “pattern or practice” case).
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THE FORMATION OF THE BFOQ DEFENSE: THE
ACCEPTANCE OF DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
DECISIONS
A. Statutory Background

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 establishes a stringent barrier
to discriminatory acts by prohibiting the pervasive gender discrimination
that has historically prevented women from accessing equal opportunities
in the workplace. 7 However, Title VII originated as a protective measure
for individuals who had suffered race, religion, and national origin-based
discrimination. The inclusion of gender protections in the landmark
legislation was added on the floor of the House of Representatives where it
was only conceived as an eleventh-hour legislative strategy to defeat the
passage of the broader statute. 8 At the time, critics of Title VII argued that
the inclusion of gender-based protections mandated further meetings,
hearings, and findings, as gender was fundamentally different from the
other types of protected classes in the bill and, consequently, should be
treated in separate legislation. 9 Therefore, the critics argued, Title VII
could not pass in its current form. 10 Yet, the argument failed to carry the
day and Title VII was passed with the amendment to protect gender

7. “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
8. 110 CONG. REC. 2547–84 (1964) (record of the offering to amend the statute to
include women). On the floor, Congressman Howard W. Smith read a letter from a female
constituent who lobbied for gender-based protections by explaining that women needed jobs
to compensate for their inability to find a husband. Smith, in introducing the gender-based
provision, facetiously asked his Congressional colleagues: “[W]hy the Creator would set up
such an imbalance of spinsters, shutting off the ‘right’ of every female to have a husband of
her own, is, of course, known only to nature. But I am sure you will agree that this is a
grave injustice.” Id, at 2577 (1964).
9. See id. (statement of Rep. Celler quoting letter from United States Department of
Labor); id. at 2584 (statement of Rep. Green arguing for the careful consideration of
biological differences between men and women in the context of employment).
10. See id. (noting critics’ views regarding the inclusion of gender-based protections in
the bill).
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discrimination fully intact. 11
Under Title VII, sex-based discrimination claims arise in a variety of
forms and may be supported by different classifications of evidentiary
support. 12 Courts have recognized a spectrum of claims, including
disparate treatment claims, which allege that a plaintiff is a member of a
protected class, that they are qualified for a position, and that they suffered
an adverse employment action, or at least were treated differently than
similarly situated employees. 13 In systemic disparate treatment claims, a
subset of disparate treatment cases, plaintiffs may prove disparate treatment
on two grounds. First, the plaintiff may demonstrate that the employer has
announced a formal policy of discrimination. 14 Second, a plaintiff who
fails to allege or demonstrate that the employer utilized a formal policy
may establish a valid systemic disparate treatment claim by demonstrating
that the employer used a pattern of employment choices that illustrates a
practice of disparate treatment. 15
Courts have established three defenses to a plaintiff’s systemic
disparate treatment claim. First, a defendant-employer may challenge
the factual basis of the plaintiff’s case, attacking the proof that
underlies the plaintiff’s claim. 16 Second, when the plaintiff utilizes
statistics to establish the systemic disparate treatment case, the
defendant-employer may challenge the inference of discriminatory
intent that the plaintiff urges. 17 An employer’s third possible defense
to a plaintiff’s systemic disparate treatment case is preserved in the
text of Title VII, where the statute explicitly allows employers to
discriminate during employment decisions on the basis of an

11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
12. See generally, Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate
Treatment: Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 105-06 (2006)
(discussing the framework for considering disparate treatment).
13. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (outlining the
initial burden of the complainant to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in a
Title VII trial).
14. See City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711
(1978) (stating that a policy requiring higher contribution into a fund simply due to being a
woman constitutes discrimination).
15. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977) (basing a
Title VII violation on whether a certain group had been treated regularly and purposely less
favorably, and whether these differences were racially motivated).
16. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 338 (1977) (stating that a defendant
“may endeavor to impeach the reliability of the [plaintiff’s] statistical evidence, [and] may
offer rebutting evidence”).
17. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 322 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding
that disparate results were reasonably shown to be attributable to the women’s low interest
rather than the employer’s lack of encouragement from the employer).
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individual’s inclusion in a protected class. 18 In contravention to the
broader theme of the text, Congress included language in Title VII that
protected discrimination on the basis of inclusion in a protected class
when being part of that class was a BFOQ for the position of
employment. 19 Section 703(e) of Title VII provides that:
. . . it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise. 20
Unfortunately, due to the limited consideration and debate over the
inclusion of gender in Title VII, there is a dearth of information concerning
the motivation, treatment, and standard of the BFOQ in Title VII’s
legislative history. After the House adopted sex as a protected class,
several Representatives urged the House to mirror the amendment in the
already existing BFOQ section as well. 21 At the time, Representative
Goodell of New York highlighted the utility of a gender-based BFOQ,
stating that:
[t]here are so many instances where the matter of sex is a
[BFOQ]. For instance, I think of an elderly woman who wants a
female nurse. There are many things of this nature which are
bona fide occupational qualifications, and it seems to me they
would be properly considered here as an exception. 22
Congresswoman Green, who had actively voiced her opposition to
amending Title VII to include gender discrimination, found that many of
her concerns were ameliorated by the inclusion of gender in the BFOQ
umbrella. She stated:
[it] make[s] a great deal of difference to [an] elderly woman and
her family as to whether [a] qualified nurse is a man or a woman.
Under the terms of [gender-based discrimination] the hospital

18. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e)(1) (2006) (permitting hiring and employment based on
religion, sex, or national origin when it would be a bona fide occupational qualification).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See 110 CONG. REC. 2718 (1964) (statement by Rep. Goodell).
22. Id.
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could not advertise for a woman registered nurse because under
the [gender] amendment . . . this would be discrimination based
on sex. The suggestion of [Mr. Goodell] helped a great deal,
however. 23
Congresswoman Green’s closing sentence, explaining that Goodell’s
amendment “helped a great deal,” implied that she personally believed that
amending the BFOQ provision to include gender would remediate some of
the danger posed by a strict reading of the language that barred sex
discrimination. 24 Yet, these explanations, which seemingly defined the
BFOQ defense as a broad provision, were some of the rare moments that
the BFOQ subsection was considered in the House.
Comparatively, the Senate’s debate provides limited but additional
demarcation, illuminating the BFOQ exception’s boundaries as a fairly
limited provision. Senator John McClellan, a staunch opponent of Title
VII, sought to introduce multiple amendments that would weaken the
strength of Title VII. Specifically, one amendment aimed to broadly
preserve an employer’s business discretion, allowing him or her to
discriminate when, on the basis of “substantial evidence,” the employer
subjectively believed that discriminatory hiring practices would be “more
beneficial” to the normal operations or goodwill of their particular
business. 25 However, Senator Clifford Case, the floor manager of the bill,
countered that expanding the BFOQ provision to provide employers with
broad discretion in discriminatory hiring practices would swallow the
ultimate objective of the bill, fundamentally eliminating the legislation’s
protective power. 26 Senator McClellan’s amendment to the BFOQ

23. Id. at 2720.
24. Id.
25. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,825 (1964) (statement of Senator McClellan).
Commentators have argued that the Senate’s ultimate rejection of Senator McClellan’s
goodwill argument implies that employers have extremely limited discretion in considering
customer preferences, which is the “major component” of goodwill when making
employment decisions. Michael L. Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1030 (1977) [hereinafter Siriota].
26. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,825 (1964) (statement of Senator Case: “We who believe in
fair employment practices and the intervention of the Federal Government in this field to the
extent provided for by the leadership amendment must resist the amendment of the Senator
from Arkansas with all the power, because it would destroy the bill.”). Senator Case
additionally introduced a separate amendment, unrelated to the BFOQ exception, which had
previously been introduced and defeated in the House of Representatives. The amendment
provided that Title VII actions would be limited to decisions or practices based solely on
sex, race, national origin, or religion. Again, in the floor debate, Senator Case highlighted
that the amendment would place a heavy burden on plaintiffs, undermining the purpose the
entire statute. The amendment also failed to garner support.
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provision was subsequently defeated by a vote of sixty-one to thirty,
implying the Senate’s understanding of the BFOQ exception as a provision
with limited sweep. 27
In 1965, prior to court interpretation of the BFOQ provision, a House
report on the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1965 provided an
opportunity for Congress to clarify its reading of the crucial subsection.
While the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1965 was a legislative
source entirely separate from the Civil Rights Act, it also contained the
term “bona fide occupational qualification.” The House Education and
Labor Committee’s report on the legislation explained that the BFOQ is:
meant to apply in those rare circumstances where a reasonable,
good faith, cause exists to justify occupational distinctions based
upon religion or national origin, or the more common
circumstances, widely accepted by contemporary standards,
where a reasonable, good faith, and justifiable ground exists to
perpetuate occupational distinctions based upon sex. 28
Although legislatively distinct from Title VII, the temporal proximity
and conceptual overlap between the two BFOQ provisions implies that
Congress intended the Title VII BFOQ defense to have a similarly limited
scope of application.
Ultimately, however, due to a confluence of factors, including the
rapid inclusion of gender as a protected class in Title VII, the BFOQ
provision’s lack of prolonged debate, and the conflicting congressional
treatment of the BFOQ exemption, the BFOQ exemption had been
abandoned in murky territory, without clear scope or application. Yet, it is
worth noting that the provision had some areas of clarity. Congress
explicitly did not include race in the BFOQ exception as a result of the
United States’ historical discrimination against people in racial minority
groups, as well as due to the belief that there are no occupations that people
of a specific race could perform that other races could not. 29 But, the

27. Id. at 13,826. However, some commentators have argued that the overwhelming
defeat of Senator McClellan’s amendments were the result of acts of Congressional
solidarity and not their understanding of the scope of the bill. See Sirota, supra note 25 at
1030 (discussing considerations that may have led to the Senate’s rejection of McClellan’s
proposed amendments). Indeed, the commentators have argued that the BFOQ exception
was intended as a broad exception. See Emily Gold Waldman, The Case of the Male OBGYN: A Proposal for Expansion of the Privacy BFOQ in the Healthcare Context, 6 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 357, 368 (2004) (elaborating upon and discussing the BFOQ defense in Title
VII legislative history) [hereinafter Waldman].
28. H.R. Rep. No. 718 at 5 (1965) [emphasis added].
29. See 110 CONG. REC. 2550 (1964) (statement of Senator Cellar: “We did not include
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broader application of the law was still unclear. Commentators recognized
that if the BFOQ exception was construed broadly, as Senator McClellan
advocated, it would give way to the pervasive discrimination that had
prompted the enactment of Title VII; whereas, if the courts applied an
overly narrow reading, the BFOQ exception would offer little security to
employers who argued that they deserved some level of discretion in their
hiring practices and that, at times, employment decisions that were based
upon an individual’s inclusion or exclusion in a protected class were
necessary to effectively operate their business. 30
B. The Supreme Court’s Narrow Reading of the BFOQ Exception
The Supreme Court encountered its first substantive opportunity to
demonstrate its reading of the BFOQ exception in 1977, dissipating some
of the fog that had persisted after Congress’s cluttered treatment of the
defense. 31 In Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Supreme Court endorsed the
BFOQ exemption but only as a narrow exception to Title VII’s sweeping
stance against discrimination. 32 Dothard involved a female who sued an
Alabama state penitentiary after she applied for a “contact” correctional
counselor position and was denied the employment. 33 The penitentiary
defended the suit on several grounds, including an assertion that being male
was a BFOQ for contact positions. 34 While the Supreme Court offered a
limited reading of the BFOQ clause, stating that it was “an extremely
narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis
of sex,” the Court accepted the penitentiary’s argument that male gender
was a BFOQ for contact positions in the penitentiary. 35 The Court found

the word ‘race’ because we felt that race or color would not be a bona fide qualification, as
would be ‘national origin.’ That was left out. It should be left out.”). See also 110 CONG.
REC. 2556 (1964) (Senator Cellar explaining why Congress should reject an amendment to
add race as a BFOQ: “[T]he basic purpose of title VII is to prohibit discrimination in
employment on the basis of race or color. Now the substitute amendment, I fear would
destroy this principle. It would permit discrimination on the basis of race or color. It would
establish a loophole that could well gut this title.”).
30. Amy Kapczynski, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 112
YALE L.J. 1257, 1258-59 (2003) [hereinafter Kapczynski].
31. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
32. Id. at 334.
33. Id. at 323-24.
34. Id. at 332-33.
35. Id. at 334-37. Courts and commentators have separated, conceptually, the terms of
gender and sex. Where “sex” is defined by the biological differences between men and
women, “gender” concerns the socially constructed expected manner in which one is
supposed act as a result of their sex. However, because Title VII prohibits discrimination
based on gender as well as sex, and the close dissection of these terms is not crucial to this

HOERNER_FINAL (ARTICLE 6).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1220

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/28/2014 2:49 PM

[Vol. 16.4

that the male-only policy was rooted in the penitentiary’s real concerns for
the central function of the job – physical safety – and highlighted that in the
violent environment of the Alabama prison, it would be reductionist to
label the regulation as “romantic paternalism.” 36 The Court explained that
because it was reasonable to think that the inherent “womanhood” of the
female guards would encourage sex offenders with a history of crime
towards women to commit subsequent crimes, the presence of women in
the correctional atmosphere would undermine “[t]he essence of a
correctional counselor’s job” – to maintain prison security. 37
Consequently, despite employing a narrow reading of the BFOQ clause, the
Court accepted the correctional facility’s male-only BFOQ defense. 38
Eight years later, in Western Air Lines v. Criswell, the Supreme Court
refined its interpretation of the BFOQ exception, this time in the context of
a lawsuit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA). 39 The ADEA provides for a BFOQ defense in language that
mirrors the BFOQ language of Title VII and in Western Air Lines, the
Court illustrated that its analysis of the exception was identical under both
pieces of legislation. 40 In Western Air Lines, the Court encountered an
employment policy that required flight engineers, the third “pilot” in larger
commercial aircraft during the era, to retire at age sixty. 41 At the time of
the lawsuit, the Federal Aviation Administration refused to establish a
mandatory retirement age for flight engineers but required both pilots and
first officers on commercial flights to retire at age sixty. 42 At that time, the
ADEA generally prohibited employers from mandating retirement before
age seventy and, consequently, the employer argued that age sixty was a

comment, the terms will be used interchangeably. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187,
1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (highlighting the law’s broad indifference to distinctions between
gender and sex). Moreover, this treatment within the comment is not inconsistent with the
term’s treatment in discrimination law. Commentators have highlighted that “[t]he word
‘gender’ has come to be used synonymously with the word ‘sex’ in the law
of discrimination” and while this treatment is imperfect, it is consistent. Jonathan A.
Hardage, Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc. and the Legacy of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Does Title VII Prohibit “Effeminacy” Discrimination?, 54 ALA. L.
REV. 193, 195 (2002).
36. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 336-37.
39. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1985) (describing
Congress’s general guidance on age classification under Title VII for bona fide occupational
qualifications).
40. Id. at 416.
41. Id. at 403-05.
42. Id. at 404.
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BFOQ for flight engineers. 43 The defendant’s evidence highlighted that the
possibility of heart attacks positively correlated with increases in age and,
therefore, the defendant argued that the age sixty retirement provision was
out of concern for the physical safety interests of the airline’s passengers. 44
On appeal, the defendant-airline challenged a jury instruction, which
combined the statutory language of the ADEA and the Dothard precedent,
reading that the “BFOQ defense is available only if it is reasonably
necessary to the normal operation or essence of defendant’s business.” 45
The trial court informed the jury that “the essence of Western’s business is
the safe transportation of their passengers” and additionally stated:
One method by which defendant Western may establish a
BFOQ in this case is to prove:
(1) That in 1978, when these plaintiffs were retired, it was
highly impractical for Western to deal with each second officer
over age [sixty] on an individualized basis to determine his
particular ability to perform his job safely; and
(2) That some second officers over age [sixty] possess traits
of a physiological, psychological or other nature which preclude
safe and efficient job performance that cannot be ascertained by
means
other
than
knowing
their
age. 46
The Supreme Court, relying on the consensus of a number of U.S.
Courts of Appeals, as well as an EEOC regulation, approved the jury
instruction. 47 Citing the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
found that, alternatively, an employer could establish a BFOQ defense if it
“had . . . a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all [of the
persons in the protected class] would be unable to perform safely and
efficiently the duties of the job involved.” 48 While the latter standard is
used with less frequency than the one established in the jury instructions,
courts have utilized both standards in establishing a BFOQ defense. 49
The Supreme Court’s most recent and notable analysis of the BFOQ
exception arrived in 1991 when it considered an employer’s fetal protection

43. Id. at 406.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 407.
46. Id. at 407-08.
47. Id. at 416-17.
48. Id. at 414 (quoting Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969)).
49. See Torres v. Wis. Dept. of Health & Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d 1523, 1530 (7th Cir.
1988) (utilizing the “substantially all” standard in the BFOQ context).
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policy. 50 In International Union, UAW. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the
Supreme Court continued its narrow reading of the BFOQ exception,
rejecting a battery-manufacturer’s same-sex BFOQ defense of a policy that
excluded women who were capable of bearing children from positions that
exposed the women to lead. 51 While the defendant-corporation argued that
its fetal-protection policy fell within the third-party safety exception
BFOQ, which the court had considered in Western Air Lines, the Supreme
Court relied on the specific language of the BFOQ defense to reject the
employer’s argument. 52 The Supreme Court highlighted that the BFOQ
exception limited its application to “occupational” skills and aptitudes. 53
Consequently, although past Supreme Court cases considered BFOQs on
the basis of third-party safety, examining the safety of the inmates in
Dothard and the safety of the passengers in Western Airlines, the safety of
the third parties was part of the “essence of the business,” e.g. the safety of
inmates and the safety of passengers. 54 Comparatively, the safety of the
unborn fetuses in International Union played no part in the “essence” of
the employer’s business, which was manufacturing batteries. 55 While the
employer urged a broader interpretation of the BFOQ exception, suggesting
that the welfare of the next generation could be considered part of the
“essence” of its business, the Court rejected the argument, continuing its
trend of a limited reading of the BFOQ exception. 56
C. The Lower Courts’ Reading of the BFOQ Exception
In spite of the Supreme Court’s extremely narrow reading of the
BFOQ provision, cases which primarily focused on the employer’s interest
in the physical safety of third-parties, the lower courts have extrapolated
from Title VII and the Supreme Court’s reading of its text a variety of
different employer interests that may establish a sex-based BFOQ.

50. Int’l Union UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
51. Id. at 204.
52. Id. at 201-202; Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 406 (1985).
53. Int’l Union UAW, 499 U.S. at 202-03; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335
(1977); Western Air Lines, Inc., 472 U.S. at 401.
54. Int’l Union UAW, 499 U.S. at 202-03.
55. Id. at 203.
56. Id. Notably, Justice White highlighted in his concurrence his concern for the
Court’s narrow application of the BFOQ rule, fearing that such a reading would fail to
protect at least one same-sex BFOQs that the lower courts had already established. He
wrote that “[t]he Court’s interpretation of the BFOQ standard also would seem to preclude
considerations of privacy as a basis for sex-based discrimination, since those considerations
do not relate directly to an employee’s physical ability to perform the duties of the job.” Id.
at 219 n.8.
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Commentators have split over the manner of labeling and dividing the
lower courts’ BFOQ exceptions, naming the BFOQs different things and
dividing them in different ways, reflecting the opaqueness of justification
behind some of the courts’ decisions. 57 Generally, however, the courts
have recognized three types of broad employer interests that, when
demonstrated by an employer, establish a valid same-sex BFOQ defense.
First, lower courts have recognized an employer’s BFOQ defense when the
employer demonstrates that they have an interest in protecting the privacy
of their clientele, who desire only to be viewed by members of their same
gender. 58 Second, courts have found that an employer establishes a valid
sex-based BFOQ when the employer illustrates that it is part of the essence
of a position to “rehabilitate” their clientele, which can only be effectively
performed by members of the client’s same gender. 59 Third, the lower
courts, following in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Dothard decision,
have allowed employers to establish a BFOQ defense when the physical
safety interests of the employer and third-parties would be jeopardized by a
hiring policy that did not discriminate on the basis of gender. 60
While the Supreme Court has never explicitly accepted a privacy
interest BFOQ, the lower courts have generally held that a hiring policy is
valid when it discriminates on the basis of gender to protect an employer’s
interest in its clientele not being viewed or touched by members of the
opposite sex. 61 Surprisingly, the majority of the privacy interest BFOQ
cases have arisen in a context where the third-party clientele are offered
minimal privacy: correctional facilities. 62 Courts have found that the
privacy interests of prisoners – in being patted down during safety sweeps
or viewed improperly by opposite-sex correctional officers – legitimizes an

57. Compare Sharon M. McGowan, The Bona Fide Body: Title VII’s Last Bastion of
Intentional Sex Discrimination, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77 (2003) [hereinafter
McGowan], with Kapczynski, supra note 30 (articulating how heteronormative stereotypes
disrupt courts’ willingness to impose Title VII requirements). See also Waldman, supra
note 27 (explaining the scope of the BFOQ exception).
58. This is reading is consistent with the Congressional intent as the privacy interest
BFOQ was explicitly referenced during the debate in the House of Representatives over the
provision. 110 CONG. REC. 2718 (1964).
59. See Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Services, 859 F.2d 1523, 1532 (7th Cir.
1988) (recognizing the same-sex rehabilitation BFOQ in regards to a female prison because
many prisoners had been physically and sexually abused by men).
60. See Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that
a defendants’ removal of pregnant flight attendants from flight duty was justified under the
BFOQ exception)
61. See Gibson v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., Div. of Health, 452 S.E.2d
463, 466 n.7 (W. Va. 1994) (accepting argument that the policy was necessary to
“preserv[e] the dignity, autonomy and individuality” of the patients).
62. Waldman, supra note 27 at 372.
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employer’s gender-based hiring policy under the BFOQ provision. The
courts have been especially amenable to a correctional facility’s same-sex
BFOQ defense when the facility houses female inmates. 63 For example, in
Everson v. Michigan Department of Corrections, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a correctional facility’s female-only guard policy under a
privacy interest BFOQ. 64 There, a group of male correctional facility
employees sued their employer under Title VII for a policy that designated
250 positions as “female only.” 65 The Sixth Circuit, noting the widespread
history of abuse of female inmates at the hands of male correctional
officers, as well as the “reasonable expectations of privacy while in
prison,” found that the female-only hiring policy was justified under the
BFOQ exception because, among other factors, privacy was part of the
“essence” of the correctional facility’s business. 66
Valid privacy BFOQs have not been limited to the correctional
context and courts have recognized privacy BFOQs in other occupations
where the clientele expresses an interest in not being viewed by the
opposite gender. In addition to correctional officer positions, courts have
found privacy interest BFOQs in two other occupational scenarios:
employment in custodial work and employment in the medical field.
Courts have allowed employers to defend a same-sex hiring policy when
the custodial position involves the possibility of same-sex viewing, such as
work in a female-only dormitory or in a male-only restroom. 67 Courts have

63. See Reed v. Cnty. of Casey, 184 F.3d 597, 599-600 (6th Cir. 1999) (highlighting
the special protections female inmates are afforded by state law and finding a same-sex
BFOQ); Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109, 1109-11 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that privacy,
security, and rehabilitation interests were all ensnared in the female prison context). See
also Kim Shayo Buchanan, Beyond Modesty: Privacy in Prison and the Risk of Sexual
Abuse, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 751 (2005) (arguing that female prisoners deploy the protection of
the Fourth Amendment against unscrupulous actions taken by male prison guards).
The privacy concerns of female inmates are often intertwined with concerns of guard-onprisoner sexual abuse. However, because this sexual misconduct falls into the physical
safety interest BFOQ category, it is not explicitly addressed here. Additionally, some
commentators have noted that the privacy-interest BFOQ are usually evaluated using a two
part test. “First, [the courts] evaluate whether using employees of a particular gender
implicates the ‘essence of the business,’ looking at whether bodily modesty interests are at
stake. Second, the commentators argue that courts analyze whether the employer can
selectively assign job responsibilities to minimize the privacy clashes that would otherwise
ensue.” Waldman, supra note 27 at 372. However, because this analysis is not particular to
privacy interests and is generally applicable to all same-sex BFOQs, this analysis should not
be considered under the isolation of the same-sex privacy umbrella. Id.
64. Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 761 (6th Cir. 2004).
65. Id. at 739-40.
66. Id. at 757 (quoting Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir.1992)).
67. See Hernandez v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 793 F. Supp. 214 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding
that the defendant university had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether female
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additionally recognized an employer’s privacy interest BFOQ in a number
of cases in the medical field, where the employer’s clientele have
maintained an interest in not being viewed or examined by members of the
opposite sex. 68
In the second category of same-sex BFOQs, courts have recognized an
employer’s BFOQ defense when the employer establishes that
discriminatory hiring is necessary to effectively address the “rehabilitative”
goals of a position. As with the same-sex privacy BFOQ exception, courts
have been receptive to the “rehabilitative” same-sex BFOQ in the context
of correctional facility hiring. In Torres v. Wisconsin Department of
Health and Social Services, for example, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals highlighted the importance of rehabilitation in the prison context,
which only female guards could provide to the employer’s female
inmates. 69 The Seventh Circuit, noting that many of the female prisoners
previously had suffered both physical and sexual abuse at the hands of
males, highlighted the testimony of the prison’s superintendent who argued
that providing female prisoners with an environment free of men in
positions of authority was necessary to foster the facility’s rehabilitative
goal. 70 Although the court required additional facts to resolve whether the
rehabilitative goal was supported by same-sex hiring, the court made clear
that the employer could establish the rehabilitative BFOQ defense on the
totality of the circumstances in the record. 71 Additionally, the court did not
demand that the employer produce an objective record of the rehabilitative
necessity of female guards, which the district court had more stringently

sex was a BFOQ for custodial work in a women’s dormitory); Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys.,
590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (holding that male sex was a BFOQ for a janitorial
position in a male restroom during daylight hours); Brooks v. ACF Indus., Inc., 537 F. Supp.
1122 (S.D. W.Va. 1982) (holding that sex was bona fide occupational qualification for
employment in an employer’s custodial department because duties of custodian included
work in the male bathhouses where there was no reasonable plan that the employer could
implement to solve the conflict between male employees’ privacy rights and female janitor’s
employment rights).
68. See EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr, No. CIV-80-1374-W, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11256, at *13 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982) (finding that female sex was a BFOQ for a staff
nurse position in the labor and delivery area because a number of patients had expressed
discomfort with the presence and use of male nurses); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc.,
447 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Del. 1978) aff’d, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that a
nursing home had a factual basis for believing that the employment of a male nurse’s aide
would “would directly undermine the essence of its business operation because . . . many of
the female guests would not consent to intimate personal care by males”).
69. Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d 1523, 1530-32 (7th Cir.
1988).
70. Id. at 1530.
71. Id. at 1532.
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required. 72
Courts have also entertained the idea of a same-sex
rehabilitative BFOQ in contexts besides prisons, such as in a university
campus security position, where consoling female victims of sexual assault
was necessarily a female-only position and, thus, could establish a samesex BFOQ. 73
Finally, courts have generally accepted an employer’s same-sex
BFOQ defense when the employer establishes that part of the essence of its
business is “physical safety,” which can only be maintained by a hiring
policy that discriminates on the basis of gender. Surprisingly, after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dothard, lower courts have been hesitant to
characterize male sex as a BFOQ for correctional officer positions where
the peculiar and unsafe circumstances, like those of the Alabama prison in
Dothard, have not been present. 74 However, a limited number of decisions,
following the general analysis in Dothard, have recognized that a maleonly hiring policy was necessary to protect the physical safety interests of
the employer in maintaining the security of a prison by not surrounding the
mostly male inmates with women guards. 75 Courts have been less reticent
to accept the physical safety interests of female inmates in the correctional
environment, finding that a same-sex BFOQ for female guards is often
necessary to protect the female inmates from sexual abuse by male
guards. 76 In this context of female inmates and male guards, there is an
overlap of BFOQ concerns, inextricably intertwining the privacy interests

72. Id.
73. Moteles v. Univ. of Pa., 730 F.2d 913, 921 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussing that the
defendant-employer should have had the opportunity to establish a BFOQ for the position at
issue).
74. See Griffin v. Mich. Dept. of Corr., 654 F. Supp. 690, 704 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(stating that “[i]t is consistent with common sense, fairness and the state of the law to say
that a blanket exclusion of women, in order to protect them from the rigors and difficulty of
the prison system, is clearly unlawful under Title VII.”); see also Bagley v. Watson, 579 F.
Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Or. 1983) (highlighting that there was no demonstrable evidence that
female prison guards could not safely or efficiently perform the task of guarding male prison
inmates); Gunther v. Iowa State Men’s Reformatory, 462 F.Supp. 952, 956–58 (N.D. Iowa
1979), aff’d, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980) (dismissing the
Dothard court’s “stereotypical” views of the capacity of female guards to safely maintain a
mostly male prison population).
75. See St. John’s Home for Children v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm’n, 375 S.E.2d
769, 771 (W. Va. 1988) (finding that male-only BFOQ was necessary for child care
professionals working with boys because “[s]upervising violent, aggressive, male
adolescents involves protecting the weaker members of the patient community from the
stronger ones . . . .”).
76. Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 754 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that a
correction facility’s plan to mostly govern female prisoners with female prison employees
was a logical approach and would “significantly enhance security at the [prison’s] female
facilities.”).
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of the prisoners, which have been discussed above, and their corresponding
physical concerns. 77 Courts have additionally evaluated and recognized a
same-sex physical interest BFOQ in limited scenarios where the “essence”
of an employer’s business involves the safe travel of third parties and the
pregnancy of a female employee, which could potentially jeopardize the
successful completion of that safety objective. 78
The lower courts’ acceptance of same-sex discrimination under the
BFOQ exception is not as sweeping as it initially may seem. Courts have
generally maintained the Supreme Court’s reading of the BFOQ provision
as a “narrow” exception to the Title VII rule against discrimination,
recognizing that a broader reading would engulf the protections that Title
VII provides. 79 Nevertheless, it is worth noting the types of BFOQ
arguments that the lower courts have consistently rejected. These
arguments illustrate the alignment of the lower courts and the Supreme
Court when applying the BFOQ exception, as well as the extremely fine
line, and perhaps inconsistency, between the lower courts’ acceptance and
rejection of some employers’ BFOQ arguments.
Courts have most readily disposed of employers’ same-sex BFOQ
arguments when they are premised on traditional sex stereotypes. A
number of courts have held that employers cannot defend a male-only
hiring policy through a BFOQ defense for positions that involve
demanding physical labor or heavy lifting. In these circumstances, courts
have highlighted that an employer’s reliance on assumptions about female
physical capacity or gender stereotypes about female strength are
misplaced and do not sufficiently support a same-sex BFOQ defense. 80 For
77. See Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109, 1109-11 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that privacy,
security, and rehabilitation interests were all ensnared in the female prison context);
Everson, 391 F.3d at 754.
78. Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that a
defendants’ removal of pregnant flight attendants from flight duty was justified under the
BFOQ exception). However, in Levin, the limitation was placed on pregnant females, not
females generally, illustrating a common dispute under the BFOQ exclusion.
There is a fourth category of BFOQ cases that is rarely considered, in which employers rely
on federal statutory support to ratify their sexually discriminatory employment choices.
In Hill v. Berkman, for example, the court held that the Army’s male-only policy for combat
positions, which has subsequently been abandoned, was not a Title VII violation because the
federal statutory authority addressed and demanded the discrimination. 635 F. Supp. 1228
(E.D. N.Y. 1986).
79. See supra Part II. B.
80. Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir. 1973) cert. granted,
vacated, 414 U.S. 970 (1973); see also Gunther v. Iowa State Men’s Reformatory, 462 F.
Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979) aff’d, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980)(explaining that a refusal to
hire a woman on the basis of stereotyped characterizations is prohibited by the equal
employment provision); Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co. of Ky., 583 F.2d 275, 280-81
modified on denial of reh’g, 587 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1978) (finding that the employer’s “bona
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example, in Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., the court rejected an
employer’s BFOQ defense of a policy that prohibited hiring married
women into production jobs because the policy was based on sex
stereotypes concerning the women’s physical capacity. 81 In Jurinko, the
employer maintained a practice of placing new employees into the most
physically demanding jobs in its production field. 82 The defendantemployer argued that the policy reasonably assumed that women, as a
class, would not be able to perform every production job necessary for its
line of business due to their lacking physical strength. 83 However, the court
found that the individual capacities of women should be measured as such
and that the company’s assumption of the physical incapacity of women
was both legally and logically misplaced. 84 Therefore, the court held that
because the employer’s defenses were based on gender stereotypes they
were insufficient to establish a BFOQ defense. 85
One of the most challenging areas of the lower court’s same-sex
BFOQ doctrine – and one of the murkiest in terms of court logic – involves
the gender preferences of an employer’s clientele. Generally, courts have
held that an employer cannot justify a sex-based BFOQ defense based upon
its customer’s broad preference for one gender over another. In Fernandez
v. Wynn Oil Company, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an
employer’s sex-based BFOQ defense for hiring a male to its Director of
International Operations position when the employer argued that the
customer preferences of its South American clientele demanded that a male
occupied the position. 86 The court held that even if the record supported
the conclusion that a female would have a harder time dealing in business
in South America due to the region’s cultural bias against women, the
clientele business partners’ stereotypical view of women was insufficient to
support the employer’s gender-based BFOQ defense. 87 Yet, several courts
fide lifting requirement cannot be implemented by the blanket exclusion of all females”;
Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1971)(finding that the “company
attempts to raise a commonly accepted characterization of women as the ‘weaker sex’ to the
level of a BFOQ”); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969)
(holding that the legitimate requirement of lifting thirty five pounds be open to men and
women).
81. Jurinko, 477 F.2d at 1044 n.11.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1981).
87. Id. at 1276; see also Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp.
802 (N.D. Cal. 1992)(stating that fellow employees’ and customers’ moral preferences do
not constitute BFOQ for sex discrimination); Bollenbach v. Bd. of Educ. of MonroeWoodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 659 F. Supp. 1450, 1472 (S.D. N.Y. 1987) (finding that the
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have implied, but never held, that when accommodating a customer
preference for gender supports the essence of a business, it may be possible
for an employer to establish a same-sex BFOQ. 88 In Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., the Fifth Circuit did not accept an employer-airline’s
argument that its customers’ preference for female flight attendants
justified their female-only hiring policy because it did not go to the essence
of their business: providing safe transportation. 89 However, the court
reasoned that a customer preference could justify a gender-based BFOQ
when it is premised on “the company’s inability to perform the primary
function or service it offers.” 90 Yet, decisions that have formally held that
a customer preference justifies a BFOQ have been rare, if non-existent. 91
Courts have been similarly dismissive of employers’ same-sex BFOQ
defenses when they are premised on deference to the employer’s business
discretion. Like the customer-preference argument, lower courts have been
hesitant to accept employers’ arguments that courts should be deferential to
an employer’s business judgment when they maintain a discriminatory
hiring policy. For example, in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, a court found
that an airline’s business judgment, which called for exploiting “female sex
appeal” in ticket sales positions as a marketing tool in an attempt to ensure
profitability, was an insufficient justification for a female-only hiring
policy. 92 While the court recognized that the airline’s policy might have
aided their profit-based endgame, the small gain in the “battle-of-inches”
with other airlines was not a sufficient basis to support a sex-based BFOQ
defense. 93
school district violated VII when they assigned only male drivers to bus routes serving
private religious schools that strongly preferred male drivers).
88. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
89. Id. at 388.
90. Id. at 389; see also Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 294-95 (N.D.
Tex. 1981) (discussing that advertisements of airlines use of attractive females in positions
with consistent customer contact was a crucial part of its corporate image).
91. Courts have deemed, in dicta, that being female is a BFOQ for the position of a
Playboy Bunny because female sexuality is reasonably necessary to perform the essence of
the job, to excite and entice male customers. See Aromi et al. v. Playboy Club, Case No.
CS-32986-74 (New York Human Rights Appeal Board, 1971) (discussing the decisions of
St. Cross v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 773, Case No. CFS 22618-70 (New York Human
Rights Appeal Board, 1971); Weber v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 774, Case No. CFS
22619-70 (New York Human Rights Appeal Board, 1971)). Generally, sexualized
businesses, such as the Hooters Restaurant chain, which incorporates both food service as
well as scantily clad servers, have raised questions about the limitations of the customer
preference doctrine. See generally, Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy
Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 204 (2004)
(discussing the merits of Hooters policy to hire certain applicants).
92. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. 292 at 303.
93. Id. at 304. Courts have considered also considered business discretion argument in
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At this point, it is helpful to untangle the classes of valid and invalid
BFOQs, to which there is some degree of overlap. Commentators have
highlighted that the customer preference and business discretion BFOQs,
which courts have sweepingly rejected, are similar to the privacy and
rehabilitation BFOQs, which the courts have accepted. 94 It is undisputable
that, to some degree, the privacy and rehabilitative interests of an employer
contain some logical overlap with customer preferences. However, they
are not inseparable. The rehabilitation BFOQ, which permits sex-based
hiring in order to further the goal of psychological rehabilitation, is
dependent upon the premise of the clientele more readily accepting the help
of individuals of the same gender. Yet, unlike the customer preference
BFOQ, this acceptance is not necessarily the result of the same level, or
type, of subconscious process. A woman who distrusts males after years of
abuse at the hands of a male is not like an airplane passenger who simply
prefers female attendants. An abused woman can react subconsciously to
reject males out of a fundamentally uncontrollable fear or repulsion, which
results from the harms that lurk in her past. 95 The airline passenger’s
customer preference is not a result of fear but rather, a different type of
subconscious process, which is based upon positive attraction. 96 While
both preferences are the result of subconscious processes, courts may
distinguish between the two because the abused woman’s fear may be
retroactively the result of a purely negative and harmful experience,
whereas the male’s choice, as it is attraction based, appears less reactionary
and seems to be the result of a greater level of discernment and decisionmaking. More likely, the courts have distinguished between rehabilitation
and customer preference BFOQs as a result of the necessity of the
underlying employment objective. Customer-preference is often attacked
on the grounds that the gender-discrimination does not further the
a variety of other contexts, including female wait-staffs. See Levendos v. Stern Entm’t, Inc.,
723 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (W.D. Pa. 1989) rev’d on other grounds, 909 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.
1990) (rejecting the offered notion that only men should be waiters in a high-class restaurant
in order to display a better image to their clientele); Guardian Capital Corp. v. N.Y. State
Div. of Human Rights, 46 A.D.2d 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (finding that an employer’s
decision to replace male waiters with female waitresses was not justified under a state-based
BFOQ exception).
94. Kapczynski, supra note 30.
95. See, e.g., Olson v. Marriott Intern., Inc, 75 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1064 (D. Ariz. 1999)
(discussing the admissibility of an expert’s report that proposed that it is imperative that
women who are abused have the ability to choose the sex of their massage therapist,
“[w]ithout choice there is a potential for the reenactment of trauma”).
96. See Wilson, 517 F. Supp. 292 at 294 (noting that Southwest’s advertising agency
determined that since the commuter market served predominately male businessmen they
should shed their conservative image and project an “airline personification of feminine
youth and vitality.”).
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“essence” of many of the employment scenarios where it is offered,
whereas, in rehabilitation cases, the same-sex policy often speaks to the
heart of the employment, promoting psychological rehabilitation. 97
The same-sex privacy exception is more difficult to separate from the
customer preference doctrine, with some commentators going so far as to
call the privacy BFOQ an exception to the court’s broader rejection of the
customer-preference doctrine. 98 Ultimately, this is more or less true.
Privacy cases usually concern circumstances where clientele complain
about being viewed by individuals of an opposite gender. 99 In these cases,
while the privacy concern does not necessarily go to the “essence” of the
business, such as maintenance of a safe prison, clean dorm, or delivery of a
child, courts have acknowledged the BFOQ because of the interest of the
clientele is often supported by some evidence of psychological harm that
may result from the unwanted viewing of people of the other sex. 100
Consequently, while it is logical to categorize the privacy BFOQ as a
subset of the customer preference defense, the courts’ different treatment of
the subsection, as compared to the other customer preference cases, is also
logical due to the psychological harm that can result from an invasion of
privacy.
II. THE SAME-SEX ROLE-MODELING BFOQ
A. Role-Modeling: A Confused Acceptance
The courts have established another bona fide occupational
qualification, the same-sex “role-modeling” BFOQ, which has created a
conflicting analysis, confused acceptance, and ultimately raised more
questions than it has answered for the courts. A number of lower courts
have defended employment practices on the basis of this “role-modeling”
BFOQ, finding that sex-specific hiring was necessary to accomplish an
employer’s primary goal of role-modeling for its clientele. Yet, the same-

97. Compare Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)
(discussing that Pan-Am’s primary function is “transporting passengers safely from one
point to another”), with Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d 1523, 1532
(7th Cir. 1988) (noting that the employer’s business was “administering a prison for female
felons” and rehabilitation of the inmates is necessary).
98. See e.g., Waldman, supra note 27 at 372 (arguing that courts have “carved out a
small exception” to the customer preference doctrine when the case involves customer
preferences for employees of a particular gender to preserve the clientele’s personal
privacy).
99. Id.
100. McGowan, supra note 57 at 96-97. See also Kapczynski, supra note 30 at 1270
(discussing the possible bases for privacy BFOQ).
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sex role-modeling BFOQ remains unclear because, factually, it often lies in
combination with other BFOQs that courts often consider and reference
during their analysis. This means that, in practice, most courts devote part
of their analysis to the primacy of the role-modeling BFOQ, but then note
the legitimacy that other BFOQs add to further the “essence” of the
position. To some degree, the acknowledgement of the presence of other
same-sex BFOQs is logical. The “role-modeling” BFOQ certainly reflects
elements of the rehabilitative BFOQ explored above, but it is also
commonly found in combination with an employer’s privacy or physical
safety BFOQ defense. Consequently, while commentators have recognized
“role-modeling” as a standalone BFOQ, courts have generally not
recognized the “role-modeling” BFOQ unless it lies in combination with
another, more strongly established, occupational qualification. The “rolemodeling” same-sex BFOQ has been recognized in three basic employment
positions: positions that involve the rehabilitative efforts of youth
psychiatric facilities or sex victims; the rehabilitative effort of youth
correctional programs; and finally, moral or religious positions that
incorporate the mission of their employer. 101
In the context of youth psychiatric facilities and sex victims, the courts
have acknowledged a defendant’s same-sex role-modeling BFOQ defense
most commonly when it is found in combination with a privacy BFOQ. In
this line of cases, courts have highlighted that the essence of an employer’s
business incorporates the clientele’s interest in psychological rehabilitation,
which requires a positive role-model of the same gender. However, in this
same analysis, the courts will often note that the clientele’s subsequent
privacy interest also demand that they are treated by employees whose
gender matches their own. In one of the leading cases on the role-modeling
BFOQ, Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hospital, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals noted that the “essence” of a hospital’s business was to treat
emotionally disturbed and sexually abused children. 102 The court then
recognized aspects of both the employer’s same-sex role-modeling interests
as well as privacy interests of the children. 103 In Healey, the court stated
that for a hospital that treated emotionally and sexually abused children, the
“therapeutic mission [of the hospital] depends on subtle interactions such
as ‘role modeling’ rather than the more concrete behavior modification
techniques . . . .” 104 However, the court noted that, in addition to
therapeutic goals, “privacy concerns [also] justify [the hospital’s]

101.
102.
103.
104.

See infra Part III. A.
Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132-33 (3d Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 134.
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discriminatory staffing policy” because of the hospital staff’s role in the
hygiene, menstrual, and sexuality concerns of the patients. 105
Consequently, while the court discussed both BFOQs, it was only after the
court analyzed both and recognized the combination of the two that it
found a valid same-sex BFOQ, holding that, “due to both therapeutic and
privacy concerns, Southwood is an institution in which the sexual
characteristics of the employee are crucial to the successful performance of
the [challenged] job.” 106
Courts have recognized the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ most
commonly in the occupational context of youth correctional programs,
which, similar to positions in psychiatric hospitals, ensnare privacy
concerns. For example, in Leggett v. Milwaukee County, a court
recognized the necessity of role-modeling in a youth correctional context,
but only recognized the role-modeling BFOQ in combination with the
privacy concerns of the employer. 107 There, a female Juvenile Correctional
Officer alleged that a Milwaukee County policy, which denied women the
opportunity to earn overtime pay through working an overnight shift, was
invalid and discriminatory. 108 In denying the female guard’s claim, the
court noted that 3,264 of the youth correctional facility’s 3,851 population
were male and found that “the implementation of same-gender role
modeling and mentoring . . . provides greater rehabilitative success.” 109
The court also acknowledged that “the importance of protecting juveniles’
privacy interests . . . [and] nighttime observation of juveniles in various
states of undress and in the throes of puberty by opposite-gender staff
members is damaging and impedes the rehabilitation process.” 110 Citing
the county’s evidence, the court relied on the combination of employer’s
interests in role-modeling and clientele-privacy to justify the same-sex
BFOQ defense of the correctional facility. 111
105. Id. at 133.
106. Id. at 134; see also Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d 1523,
1528 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasizing that the validity of BFOQ can only be ascertained with a
more comprehensive understanding of the business of an employer).
107. Leggett v. Milwaukee Cnty., 04-C-422, 2006 WL 3289371 at *3 (E.D. Wis. Nov.
8, 2006). See also In re Juvenile Det. Officer Union Cnty., 837 A.2d 1101, 1109-10 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (calling the other role-modeling cases “persuasive” but only
referencing privacy interests); In Long v. State Personnel Board 41 Cal.App.3d 1000 (1974)
(finding a requirement for certain chaplains to be male permissible in part because of
privacy interests of the young boys involved); City of Phila. v. Pa. Human Relations
Comm’n, 300 A.2d. 97, 103 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973) (discussing how there is a need for certain
sexual characteristics in employees when dealing with troubled youth).
108. Leggett, 2006 WL 3289371 at *2.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *3.
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Youth correctional facilities, unlike positions in psychiatric hospitals,
have also been found to involve the same-sex physical safety BFOQ that
courts have acknowledged in adult correctional facilities. 112 In Leggett, the
court acknowledged that:
[s]exual misconduct in the institutional setting has a severe effect
on juveniles and damages the credibility and morale of the
institution in general. Moreover, heterosexual assaults and
misconduct are more likely than homosexual assaults and
misconduct. Therefore, it is inefficient from a risk management
standpoint to assign a staff member to an opposite-gender [for the
questioned position]. 113
In concluding that the employer-correctional facility had established a
valid same-sex BFOQ, the court ultimately acknowledged the presence and
importance of three BFOQs: role-modeling, privacy, and physical safety.
Finally, and most controversially, courts have acknowledged an
employer’s same-sex role-modeling BFOQ defense, even when it is not
supported by other BFOQ exceptions, in the limited circumstances in
which the “essence” of the employer’s mission is to exemplify a moral or
religious life. 114 In these cases, courts have allowed the termination of
employees due to their position as a “negative role model,” usually in
reference to unwed pregnant females. 115 In Chambers v. Omaha Girls
Club, Inc., the leading opinion on the “negative role model” BFOQ
exception, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a negative role
model BFOQ defense when an after-school club fired an unmarried female
112. Id. at *2. See also St. John’s Home for Children v. W. Va. Human Rights
Comm’n, 375 S.E.2d 769, 771 (W. Va. 1988) (finding that male-only BFOQ was necessary
for child care professionals working with boys because “[s]upervising violent, aggressive,
male adolescents involves protecting the weaker members of the patient community from
the stronger ones . . . .”).
113. Leggett, 2006 WL 3289371 at *2. In these scenarios, it appears that the courts’
concerns are actually the inverse of gender concerns in the adult correctional setting.
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977). The court is worried about female guards
sexually abusing and physically assaulting the male juveniles while in adult settings, as in
Dothard, the court worried about female guards being physically assaulted by the inmates
due to their inherent womanhood. Id. Ultimately, therefore, the court’s concerns here are
actually more reflective of the abuse scheme that courts have recognized in the male-guard
and female-inmate populations of the adult correctional facilities.
114. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987). See also
Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 271 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (finding an issue of
material fact as to whether a teacher’s pregnancy validated the school’s dismissal of her
under the BFOQ exception); Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp.
802, 808 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (acknowledging that the defendant could assert that the employee
needed to be a “role model” given their moral views).
115. Chambers, 834 F.2d 697 at 705.

HOERNER_FINAL (ARTICLE 6).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

8/28/2014 2:49 PM

THE ROLE-MODELING BFOQ

1235

instructor after she informed her employer that she was pregnant. 116 During
the trial, the employer, a club designed to assist African American
adolescent girls, highlighted that the club emphasized relationship-building
between staff-members and the youth and also that it trained its instructors
to act as role models in the hope that the girls would emulate the adults’
behavior. 117 The court found that the club’s rule banning single parent
pregnancies among its staff members was valid and recognized that “the
role model rule [was] reasonably necessary to the Club’s operations” and,
thus, the court held that the role model rule qualified as a bona fide
occupational qualification. 118
Religious employers have also been successful in defending their
termination policies based upon a negative role-modeling BFOQ. 119 For
example, in Harvey v. Young Women Christian Association, the court
ratified the termination of an unwed pregnant African American
counselor. 120
There, the employer, the Young Women Christian
Association (YWCA), argued that the counselor’s status as a single
pregnant female was “contrary to the Purpose [sic] and philosophy [of the
position] and violated plaintiff’s agreement to espouse these principles in
her employment.” 121 The court accepted the argument, finding that the
employee’s agreement to highlight the goals and philosophy of the YWCA
to the young members established a rational relationship between the
demands of her employment and the contrary opinion of her unwed
pregnancy, which was exacerbated by her stated desire to advertise her
condition of pregnancy. 122 Ultimately, the court found for the defendantemployer, implicitly accepting the legitimacy of the negative role model
BFOQ defense and utilizing it to inoculate the employer’s decision to
terminate the employee. 123
B. Lower Court Rejection of Employers’ Role-Modeling BFOQ
Arguments
Like the cases where courts have accepted the role-modeling BFOQ, it
is easiest to understand the cases where the courts have rejected the rolemodeling argument when the cases are divided by occupational theme.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 698.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 705.
Harvey v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n, 533 F.Supp. 949 (W.D. N.C. 1982).
Id. at 954.
Id. at 954-55.
Id. at 955.
Id.
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Surprisingly, the factual circumstances of the rejected cases are often quite
similar to the factual background of the cases where the courts have
recognized the role-modeling BFOQ. Despite the factual similarities, the
cases where courts have rejected the BFOQ exception are distinguished by
the courts findings, which do not acknowledge the presence of another
same-sex BFOQ. For example, in Jatczak v. Ochburg, a federal district
court ruled that an employer, whose business was counseling mentally ill
youth, failed to demonstrate that there was any type of same-sex BFOQ for
its counseling positions. 124 The employer in Jatczak, a sheltered workshop
and community mental health program for young adults, argued that it was
necessary to fill a vacant counseling position with a male because it was
necessary to have a male role model for the predominantly male workshop
population. 125 The employer specifically highlighted the program’s large
African American population, who were often involved in family situations
lacking a father or significant male role model. 126 Additionally, the
employer argued that it was necessary to hire a male to provide counseling
in sexuality and sexual development. 127 Yet, the court characterized the
sheltered workshop’s argument for a male role model as an argument for
the customer-preference of its youth clientele. 128 Ultimately, although the
court recognized that a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ might be
appropriate in some circumstances, there, the defendant-employer had
failed to meet its burden of proving that a male counselor was essential to
the function of the workshop and, consequently, the court rejected the
gender-based hiring decision. 129
Jatczak is illuminating. In Jatczak, the defendant-employer raised
many of the same role-modeling arguments that other courts had ratified,
but in this instance the court rejected their arguments. Unlike the same-sex
role-modeling BFOQ cases where the court recognized the legitimacy of
the BFOQ, in Jatczak, the court did not acknowledge the presence of
additional same-sex BFOQs. 130 Consequently, this is a case of the rolemodeling argument standing alone, unsupported by a factual finding of
another BFOQ. As a result, the court’s analysis yields a customer
preference argument as opposed to acknowledging the legitimacy of the
same-sex BFOQ.
Yet, this analysis appears to be flawed. To understand why the same-

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F.Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
Id. at 704.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 700-01.
Id. at 703-04.
Id. at 705.
Id.
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sex role-modeling BFOQ does not fall under the customer preference
umbrella, it is necessary to reassess the court’s rejection of the customer
preference BFOQ. In the line of cases where the defendant-employer has
argued that a customer-preference justifies the sex-based hiring, courts
have looked to the “essence” of the business, construed narrowly, to
determine whether or not argument has merit. 131 In Fernandez v. Wynn Oil
Company the court determined that the essence of the position was to do
business with South Americans, which could be accomplished by both
sexes. 132 In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., the court
determined that essence of the business was safe travel, and held that flight
attendants of both sexes could accomplish that task. 133
Comparatively, in cases of sexual victim and mental health counseling
and rehabilitation, the “preference” of the customers is not really at issue.
If construed insensitively, the gender preference of the youth-victims and
those with disabilities may be central to their choice or responsiveness to
an individual of the same gender. However, in these circumstances, the
“preference” is not so much of a preference as it is a reflection of the
immutable and subconscious feature of their condition or disability. 134
Consequently, in Jatczak, when the court dismissed the patients’
responsiveness to a gender as a preference, it implied a level of
consciousness and cognitive decision-making that is fundamentally
inaccurate. 135
Courts have also rejected the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ in the
context of correctional facilities when the employer has failed to illustrate
that another BFOQ, such as physical safety or privacy, would be
jeopardized by a gender-blind hiring policy. In Henry v. Milwaukee
County, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, after rejecting a juvenile
correctional facility’s privacy and physical safety BFOQ defenses,
subsequently dismissed the employer’s same-sex role-modeling BFOQ

131. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981); Diaz v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
132. Fernandez, 653 F.2d at 1276-77.
133. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388.
134. See Ashlie E. Case, Conflicting Feminisms and the Rights of Women Prisoners, 17
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 309, 316 (2005) (finding that commentators and researchers have
recognized that “anywhere between [forty] and [eighty-eight] percent of incarcerated
women have been victims of some sort of sexual and/or physical abuse sometime in their
lives prior to incarceration, the . . . ‘presence of male staff in women’s housing units’ creates
‘a sexualized atmosphere that is experienced as intimidating by the women’”).
135. The difference here may be that in Jatczak, the court found a complete lack of
“evidence” that role-modeling was a necessity for the boys, unlike other cases where the
employers had established the necessity of role-modeling function of the employment.
Jatczak, 540 F. Supp. at 704.
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argument. 136 The employer’s argument was substantively identical to the
role-modeling arguments that other courts had acknowledged in cases
involving youth correctional facilities. 137 In Henry, the superintendent of a
juvenile correctional facility explained that he had implemented a rolemodel program for his youth inmates because research indicated that
“‘gender mentoring improves the chances of child behavior changes being
positive’.” 138 Consequently, to support the role-modeling program he had
initiated, the superintendent found it necessary to hire same-sex
correctional officers for third duty, or nighttime, positions. 139 Regardless,
the court highlighted that counseling was not part of the official duties of
the correctional officers and that the night-shift position did not offer
substantial opportunities for counseling-type conversations to occur. 140
Therefore, the court found that the county had failed to support its position
that male only positions during the clientele’s sleep was reasonably
necessary for its role-modeling or rehabilitative efforts. 141
Finally, courts have essentially rejected employers’ role-modeling
BFOQ defenses in occupational circumstances that do not involve youth
and are not in combination with other same-sex BFOQ concerns. 142 For
example, in EEOC v. Hi 40 Corporation, Inc., the court, in part, dismissed
a weight loss center’s subtle argument that it was necessary for a female to
hold counseling positions at the center in order to act as positive role
models for the employer’s clientele. 143 There, the customers were ninetyfive percent women and the court acknowledged that the counselor’s duties
included providing instruction on diet programs, counseling customers
about weight, and monitoring the progress of customers. 144 While the court
recognized that the customers felt uncomfortable with men performing
many of these duties, the court construed this concern as an issue of
customer preference and refused to find a true privacy BFOQ. 145
Furthermore, although the court acknowledged that the counselors “may
serve as role models . . .” because “[o]ften counselors have had their own

136. Henry v. Milwaukee Cnty., 539 F.3d 573, 584-85 (7th Cir. 2008).
137. Id.
138. Henry, 539 F.3d at 583.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 585.
141. Id. To a large degree, this argument is the same made by other juvenile
correctional facilities the cases are essentially factually indistinguishable. The court here
distinguished Torres on the grounds that the same-sex role-modeling policy there was more
narrowly tailored. Id. at 582.
142. EEOC v. Hi 40 Corp., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 301, 305 (W.D. Mo. 1996).
143. Id. at 302.
144. Id. at 302-04.
145. Id. at 304.
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personal weight loss experience and have faced the same challenges the
customers face,” the court did not recognize this evidence as sufficient to
support a role-modeling BFOQ. 146
C. Distinguishing the Role-Modeling BFOQ and the Rehabilitation
BFOQ
After a thorough analysis of the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ, there
is a question of what distinguishes it from the same-sex rehabilitative
BFOQ. This question is important for several reasons: first, it is important
to understand why the role-modeling BFOQ should be treated separately
from the rehabilitative BFOQ; second, if the two are conceptually different
but similar, how can the courts only accept the role-modeling BFOQ when
in combination with another BFOQ but not when it stands alone?
Ultimately, the manner in which the courts have defined and shaped the
role-modeling BFOQ lends it to be a subset of the rehabilitative BFOQ as
opposed to being entirely distinct.
As courts have applied the role-modeling BFOQ, there is undoubtedly
a great deal of overlap between it and the rehabilitative BFOQ. In order to
distinguish between the two defenses, it helps to understand the scenarios
of each BFOQ’s acceptance. Courts have recognized the same-sex
rehabilitation BFOQ in circumstances where adults of a particular gender
have been negatively impacted by the other gender. 147 Consequently, in
order to facilitate their rehabilitation, it is necessary to separate them from
individuals of the other gender. 148 In rehabilitation cases, the purposes of
the same-sex policy isn’t necessarily for the positive influence of the
hiring, but rather, to avoid the negative reactions to those of the opposite
gender. 149
Comparatively, the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ aspires to the
theoretical inverse. Employers have argued and courts have accepted that
it is not necessarily the psychological rejection of the other gender that
necessitates the same-sex hiring, but rather, the rehabilitation in this
instance involves the positive pull that an individual of the same gender can
provide to an individual, usually a youth. 150 There is an underlying

146. Id. at 303.
147. See, e.g., Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d 1523, 1532 (7th
Cir. 1988) (recognizing the same-sex rehabilitation BFOQ in regards to a female prison
because many prisoners had been physically and sexually abused by men).
148. Id.
149. See id. at 1530 (noting that female prisoners had negative reactions to men in
positions of authority).
150. See, e.g., Leggett v. Milwaukee Cnty, 04-C-422, 2006 WL 3289371 at *2, *3 (E.D.
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assumption that divides the two, which is that the youth are more
emotionally and intellectually malleable, a concept lacking in the
rehabilitation BFOQ. Moreover, there is a broad assumption that in
rehabilitative scenarios, something has gone wrong. 151 In role-modeling
scenarios, there is not necessarily a need for an event or condition to
rehabilitate the clientele from. Ultimately, the ideas are quite similar, but
not the same. It is difficult to state the degree of space between the two
concepts because courts have used them closely, if not interchangeably. 152
However, fundamentally, the defining distinction between the rehabilitation
and role-modeling BFOQ lies in the underlying reason for the use of the
same-sex hiring. For adults, the goal is to avoid the clientele’s negative
reactions to the opposite gender in an attempt to not impede, and to some
degree facilitate, rehabilitation. 153 For the youth, the role-modeling BFOQ
has been used to pull their rehabilitation in a specific and positive direction
by using the influence of the employee as a conduit. 154
III. A STANDALONE ROLE-MODELING BFOQ
A. A Same-Sex Role-Modeling BFOQ is a Logical Extension of the
BFOQ Standards Already Accepted by the Courts
If the role-modeling and rehabilitative BFOQ exceptions contain such
a large degree of overlap, it would be inconsistent for the courts to assess
the two exceptions with different standards. Despite the lower courts’
rejection of the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ when it is not in
combination with another BFOQ, courts should begin to accept a
standalone role-modeling BFOQ defense. Initially, it should be noted that
courts have already begun to accept the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ. 155
In a variety of cases involving different occupational scenarios, courts have

Wis. Nov. 8, 2006) (arguing that male staff acted as models and mentors for the juveniles).
151. See, e.g., Torres, 859 F.2d 1523 (discussing at length Wisconsin’s goal of
rehabilitating female inmates).
152. See, e.g., Leggett, 2006 WL 3289371 at *2 (conflating the role-modeling and
rehabilitation BFOQs).
153. Torres, 859 F.2d 1523.
154. See Wendy Bunston, Working with Adolescents and Children who have Committed
Sex Offences, 21 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. FAM. THERAPY, 1, 5 (2000) (finding that in same-sex
group therapy of adolescent sex offenders that “the group functions as . . . a safe space
where participants can honestly disclose their individual struggles. . . . In particular, the
boys who have been in the group for longer periods are able to challenge new members
directly and this process appears to achieve a swifter level of accountability and disclosure
than would occur within individual treatment sessions.”).
155. See supra Part III. A.
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led their BFOQ analysis by establishing the primacy of a same-sex rolemodeling BFOQ. 156 However, all of these cases have followed this initial
commentary, which supports the inference of a standalone role-modeling
BFOQ, with subsequent analysis that highlights the presence of other samesex BFOQs, seemingly undermining the comprehensive legitimacy of the
role-modeling defense.
Although some cases have recognized the role-modeling BFOQ when
it is not in combination with another BFOQ defense, such as the line of
cases that involve the termination of employees that would act as “negative
role-models” for the clientele, these cases are not truly Title VII gender
cases. The courts have acknowledged that it is not really the gender that is
the BFOQ, but rather the state of unwed pregnancy. 157 Often, the
employers’ conditions of employment in these cases do not simply prohibit
the employment of unwed pregnant women, but also unwed men who have
caused a pregnancy. 158 Therefore, while the courts have analyzed these
cases under a Title VII disparate treatment analysis, on the basis of their
discrimination against women, a proper application of the Title VII
doctrines would analyze the discrimination under a disparate systemic
impact standard because the statute is facially neutral. 159 In these instances,
the BFOQ exception would not apply and, instead, a business necessity
defense would be applicable. 160 Additionally, in the limited cases where
the employment standards in question do facially discriminate on basis of
gender, only preventing unwed pregnant females from maintaining
employment, the condition of employment still is not gender based - it is
based on the alternative lifestyle the pregnancy represents. 161

156. Id.
157. See Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 1987)
(allowing a rule that terminated negative role-modeling, which included “single parent
pregnancies,” including both pregnant females and males causing pregnancy).
158. Id.
159. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (asserting that facially neutral
policies are considered under Title VII’s disparate impact standard).
160. See Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 1980)
(finding that although the BFOQ exception and business necessity are similar, they are not
identical). Generally, the business necessity defense is asserted by employers in disparate
impact cases where they maintain that a hiring practice, although having a disparate impact
on a protected class, “accurately – but not perfectly – ascertains an applicant’s ability to
perform successfully the job in question.” El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 242
(3d Cir. 2007).
161. See, e.g., Harvey v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n, 533 F.Supp. 949, 954 (W.D.
N.C. 1982) (stating that “the motivating factor behind the discharge of the plaintiff was not
that she was female, nor that she was pregnant, nor that she was black,” but rather that she
intended to represent to her youth groups a lifestyle contrary to the mission of her
employer).
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Consequently, while this lineage of cases leads towards the idea of a samesex role-modeling BFOQ, it does not cleanly establish a standalone samesex role-modeling BFOQ due to the confusion that the unwed pregnancy
places over the defense. Ultimately, both the courts’ acknowledgement of
the role-modeling BFOQ in combination with other BFOQs and the courts’
recognition of role-modeling BFOQ of unwed pregnant mothers support
the position of a standalone same-sex role-modeling defense.
More importantly, a standalone same-sex role-modeling BFOQ is
logical because it is consistent with the standard articulated by the Supreme
Court in Dothard and its other BFOQ cases. 162 By definition, it should not
be necessary for a bona fide occupational qualification to be found in
combination with another BFOQ to create a defense if it sufficiently
satisfies the statutory standard. No phrase in Title VII, its legislative
history, or in the precedent of the courts supports the inference that a
BFOQ cannot, by itself, create an employer defense. Title VII simply
states that it will not be unlawful “for an employer to hire and employ
employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where [the protected class] is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise.” 163 Statutorily, there is no demand for multiple
layers of reasoning to support a BFOQ defense. The other gender-based
BFOQs that the courts have accepted have been recognized, at least on one
occasion, on their own merit and not in combination with another BFOQ. 164
It would be both doctrinally and logically inconsistent to demand this
stringent combination of BFOQ support for only the same-sex rolemodeling BFOQ.
Finally, while the Supreme Court and lower courts have consistently
read the BFOQ defense as a narrow exception to the Title VII rule against
gender discrimination, the role-modeling BFOQ coalesces with the courts’
limited reading of the provision. Stated bluntly, there are many
occupational circumstances, including the positions already highlighted by
the courts, where same-sex role-modeling “is reasonably necessary to the
normal operation or essence of defendant’s business.” 165 In employment
contracts where the necessity of moral character is considered, rolemodeling is clearly an essential part of the business. Yet, the rolemodeling BFOQ should not be limited to these occupational circumstances.

162. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (interpreting Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as permitting sex-based discrimination in circumstances that reasonably
require the normal operation of a particular business).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006).
164. See supra Part II. C.
165. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333.
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Commentators have defined role-modeling in a variety of ways, but
Theodore Kemper, an author of a number of social power and status
papers, has described a role model as a person who “‘possesses skills and
displays techniques which [an] actor lacks . . . and from whom, by
observation and comparison with his own performance the actor can
learn.’” 166 In positions where the necessity, or centrality, of this type of
role-modeling is clearly considered, especially where youth of a particular
gender is involved, it is apparent that part of the “essence” of the
employer’s business is to provide a strong role-model for their clientele. In
these instances, consistency and logic demand that the employer is afforded
the privilege of the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ as they would with
other BFOQ defenses.
B. Standalone Same-Sex Role-Modeling Utilitarian Value
The courts’ application of a “role-modeling” BFOQ, which does not
need to be found in combination with another BFOQ, has the potential to
increase the productivity of crucial areas of society, namely education.
Several occupations, including youth counselors and educators, incorporate
role-modeling as a central objective of their position. Even within Title
VII, Congress has already illustrated that BFOQs in the educational sphere
are different than BFOQs in other employment scenarios. Congress wrote
in Title VII:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school,
college, university, or other educational institution or institution
of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion
if such school, college, university, or other educational institution
or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part,
owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion
or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or
if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other
educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward
the
propagation
of
a
particular
religion. 167
While, contextually, the BFOQ preserved by Congress in this text
explicitly relates to religious educational institutions, it is a concession that

166. Jeanne J. Speizer, Role Models, Mentors, and Sponsors: The Elusive Concepts, 6
SIGNS 692, 693 (1981) [hereinafter Speizer] (citing Theodore D. Kemper, Reference
Groups, Socialization and Achievement, 33 AM. SOC. REV. 31-45 (1968)).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (2006) [emphasis added].
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highlights that the educational environment, and the position of teacher, is
inherently different than other employment scenarios when it comes to the
characteristics of its employees. 168 In fact, the religious education
provision was questioned for many reasons during the legislative debate,
but the legislators readily concurred that it was necessary for the teachers to
adhere to the religious denomination of the exempt organization for it to
effectively carry out its mission. 169 At the core of this concession is the
idea that educational leaders should possess the traits and characteristics
that they are trying to instill in the children because role-modeling is part of
the essence of their position. 170
While the implication of the religious educational exemption gives
some encouragement, more fundamentally, courts should allow educational
institutions to choose employees on the basis of sex, accepting rolemodeling as a standalone same-sex BFOQ, because role-modeling is part of
the “essence” of educational positions. The Supreme Court’s test for
BFOQ establishes that a same-sex BFOQ is sufficient when a gender is
necessary for an occupation because it “is reasonably necessary to the
normal operation or essence of defendant’s business.” 171 Clearly, the role
of educational institutions is to educate their students, or youth clientele.
But how do we define the scope of what the teachers are supposed to
168. See Ashlie C. Warnick, Accommodating Discrimination, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 119,
169 (2008) [hereinafter Warnick] (highlighting that “[a]bsent the religious employmentdiscrimination exceptions, schools would not be able to ensure that their employees were
devout followers of the faith or conducted their lives as role models for students”) [emphasis
added]. However, some courts have highlighted that one of Congress’ primary motivations
for the exemption of religious schools from Title VII requirements was the legislators’
desire to avoid religious-freedom complications. See Feldstein v. Christian Sci. Monitor,
555 F. Supp. 974, 976 (D. Mass. 1983) (stating that some of the senators expressed concern
that without an exemption for religious organizations, “an unconstitutional encroachment on
the operations of religious organizations by the government would result”).
169. 110 CONG. REC. 2587 (1964) (Representative Roush stating, “I lived on the campus
of a denominational college. That college insists not only that its administrators, not only its
teachers and professors adhere to its religious beliefs, but insists that the janitors and
everyone else who is employed by that school to adhere to those beliefs. That college should
have the right to compel the individuals it employs to adhere to its beliefs, for that college
exists to propagate and to extend to the people with whom it has influence its convictions
and beliefs. To force such a college to hire an ‘outsider’ would dilute if not destroy its effect
and thus its very purpose for existence.”)
170. Warnick, supra note 168 at 167 (explaining that “[i]t seems evident that the central
purpose of religious organizations and their schools is to convey their religious message and
teachings. The Archdiocese of Chicago, for instance, says that its ‘schools exist primarily to
evangelize and educate students for the Church’s mission.’ By requiring employees to
conduct their personal lives according to religious doctrine, religious schools communicate
to their students the righteousness of those beliefs. All employees act as role models for a
school’s students.”).
171. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 407 (1985).

HOERNER_FINAL (ARTICLE 6).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

THE ROLE-MODELING BFOQ

8/28/2014 2:49 PM

1245

teach? If teachers are charged with merely teaching the content of their
grade-level curriculum, which construes the role of educators extremely
narrowly, then it appears that the task of role-modeling is not truly part of
the
“essence”
of
their
position.
Yet, many researchers, educational theorists, and courts, who have
considered the role of teachers, have found that the role-modeling aspect of
an educator’s position is one of its core elements. This consideration of
educators as role models for their pupils stretches back to the foundations
of the country. 172 In colonial America, communities expected teachers to
be religiously conservative, morally acceptable, and loyal to the local
government. 173 As the country and the position of the American educator
matured with industrialization and urbanization, the strict shackles placed
on the educator’s life loosened, reflecting a weakening emphasis placed on
religious values, but the inherent notion of educators as role models did not
abate. 174 Today, although under less scrutiny than in past eras, teachers are
still
expected
to
be
exemplars
of
morality. 175
Courts have echoed this understanding, acknowledging that teachers
are role models in decisions that have occurred outside of the BFOQ
context. 176 Yet, courts have also recognized that there are bounds to the
discretion that school boards may employ when considering the morality of
their teachers. 177 Generally, courts have established that school districts
may not terminate an educator simply because the district disapproves of an
educator’s lifestyle, but the district possesses broad discretion when a
teacher’s immorality in the community is likely to have a negative impact
on their teaching. 178
In Littlejohn v. Rose, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a
school board’s decision not to rehire a recently divorced teacher was a
violation of the teacher’s freedom of choice in a family matter. 179
Comparatively in Sullivan v. Meade Independent School District, No. 101,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the termination of an
unmarried teacher who lived with a male friend close to school because it

172. John Martin Rich, The Teacher as an Exemplar, 75 HIGH SCHOOL J. 94 (19911992) [hereinafter Rich].
173. Id. at 94.
174. Id. at 95.
175. Id. at 96-97.
176. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Meade Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 101, 530 F.2d 799 (8th Cir.
1976) (discussing a school district’s dismissal of a teacher that was viewed in the
community as a role model for conduct, which was seen as violating the communities values
while not entertaining a BFOQ defense).
177. Rich, supra note 172 at 96-97.
178. Id. at 95-96
179. Littlejohn v. Rose, 768 F.2d 765, 771 (6th Cir. 1985).
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was a violation of community values and had an adverse effect on
students. 180 While these cases stress that the teachers’ “immorality” 181
would affect their ability to effectively perform their position, it is clear
that the goal of the occupation in these cases utilizes a broader conception
of an educator’s role, incorporating themes of role-modeling that entangle
more than merely teaching grade-level content.
In 2003, the Supreme Court briefly addressed the role-modeling
argument in the seminal affirmative action case Grutter v. Bollinger. 182
The Court wrote that:
[i]n order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes
of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race
and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must
have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational
institutions
that
provide
this
training. 183
Although the Court notably focused on the legitimacy of the
government due to its racial diversity, its subsequent accent on the “path”
to leadership emphasizes an accessibility that is reflective of role-modeling
theory. 184
Researchers have provided additional support to the courts’
understanding of teachers as role models. Commentators have often taken
the role of educators as role-models to be so fundamental that little analysis
is given. These commentators simply take for granted that it is implicitly
part of a teacher’s occupation to be a positive role-model. Jeanne J.
Speizer writes that “the presence of role models in the learning
environment has been considered an important aspect [of some educational
scenarios]. . . [and] [t]he value of role models in other settings and for other
populations has often been asserted.” 185 Other researchers simply state that
modeling and role-modeling are fundamentally part of the expectations of

180. Sullivan, 530 F.2d at 808.
181. Id. at 801.
182. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).
183. Id.
184. Id. However, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, the Supreme Court
directly confronted the idea of role-modeling in schools, rejecting “role-modeling” as the
basis of affirmative action policy because it had no logical stopping point and was unrelated
to the underlying harm that affirmative action attempts to remedy. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
While Wygant is instructive of the limits on role-modeling in the affirmative action context,
role-modeling is considered by a different standard in the BFOQ context and, consequently,
Wygant is not given substantial treatment in this Comment. Id.
185. Speizer, supra note 166 at 694.
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the occupation of an educator. For example, John M. Rich writes that
“[m]any school boards and communities expect teachers to set good
examples and act as exemplars to students in their dress, grooming, social
amenities, and morals.” 186 Other commentators have highlighted the
difference in efficacy of teachers when they are considered role models. 187
While this does not necessarily prove that role-modeling is part of the
“essence” of their job, it supports the conceptual framework that if
educational gains are narrowly considered the only “essence” of the
teacher’s role, then role-modeling can contribute significantly to that core
goal and, thus, may be incorporated as part of the “essence” of the
position. 188 In this light, the definition of role model and teachers are so
closely tied, that some find them to be interchangeable. 189
Ultimately, the degree to which role-modeling is considered part of
the “essence” of an educator’s job will be case-by-case. Formal teacherstudent role-modeling programs and informal emphases on the relationship
between educators and students have proliferated in education, especially
in the urban context, as researchers and districts have noted the need and
efficacy of these structures. 190 Researchers have noted that many concerns
of the inner-city school, including “[p]overty, infant mortality, one-parent
homes, children raising children, racism, child abuse, substance abuse,
urban blight, declining test scores” have prompted the initiation of formal
role-modeling programs. 191 Perhaps, in factual scenarios where rolemodeling is officially part of the faculty’s duty, it would be far more likely
in these contexts that a court would find role-modeling as part of an
occupation’s central objective.
Finally, it is worth noting that many of the other same-sex BFOQs,
such as privacy interests, physical safety interests, and rehabilitative
interests, are present in the educational sphere, albeit to a degree that does
186. Rich, supra note 172 at 94.
187. See Thomas Dee, Teachers, Race, and Student Achievement in a Randomized
Experiment, 86 REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 195, 209 (2004) [hereinafter Dee] (finding that
“role-model effects” lead to student achievement and indicate that assignment to an ownrace teacher significantly increased the math and reading achievement of both black and
white students).
188. See, e.g., Andrew J. Martin & Martin Dowson, Interpersonal Relationships,
Motivation, Engagement, and Achievement: Yields for Theory, Current Issues, and
Educational Practice, 79 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 327, 333 (2009) [hereinafter Martin &
Dowson] (discussing how interpersonal relationships, like those with a teacher, can lead to
academic success).
189. See, e.g., Dennis E. Fehr, When Faculty and Staff Mentor Students in Inner-city
Schools, 25 MIDDLE SCHOOL J., 65 (1993) (defining mentor as a word that could mean role
model or teacher).
190. Id.
191. Id.
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not meet the level that would establish a BFOQ. Therefore, while none of
these interests are strong enough in this educational context to actually
establish a same-sex BFOQ by itself, courts, which have been more
acquiescent to BFOQ arguments when other interests are present, should
more readily accept the role-modeling BFOQ in an educational
employment case when the other interests are lurking in the factual
background of the case. 192 A court’s analysis of the privacy, physical
safety, and rehabilitative interests of a school will differ factually from case
to case, but generalizing can serve to illustrate the basic premise of the
argument. While the interests of many same-sex BFOQs are present in the
educational context, the privacy concerns of students are likely an issue at
almost every grade level. The Supreme Court has considered the privacy
interests of public school students in a variety of Fourth Amendment cases,
illustrating the specter of privacy invasion that looms in the public school
environment. 193 While the accepted privacy BFOQ cases have mostly dealt
with same-sex viewing, some cases have gone as far to note that privacy
interests are concerned where conversation involving private, or sexual,
matters are concerned. 194 Consequently, in some school districts, especially
those that require heavy searches or observation by teachers, the same-sex
privacy interests of its students may support a same-sex hiring decision.
Perhaps, if a school were to illustrate physical safety or rehabilitative
interests, hiring decisions based on same-sex role-modeling could be
supported by the additional physical restraint or rehabilitative concerns that
are only possible through gender-based hiring. 195
C. The Potential Achievement Gains Made by the Hiring of Same-Sex
Teachers
A standalone same-sex role-modeling BFOQ would provide

192. See supra Part III. A.
193. See, e.g., Shannon O’Pry, A Constitutional Mosh Pit: The Fourth Amendment,
Suspicionless Searches, and the Toughest Public School Drug Testing Policy in America, 33
TEX. TECH L. REV. 151, 166-238 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
involving searches of students on school grounds and the application to various scenarios).
194. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132-133 (3d Cir. 1996).
195. These ideas may seem far-fetched, but the diversity of the educational landscape in
the United States, which can often involve both orderly and violent schools, not all that
dissimilar from a prison, and students who have mental health or learning disability issues,
not dissimilar from those in psychiatric hospitals, suggests that there may be utility for such
a rule. See generally, Kari L. Higbee, Student Privacy Rights: Drug Testing and Fourth
Amendment Protections, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 361, 365 (2005) (stating that “[w]ith the influx of
school-related violence and increasing drug-related problems, school administrators have
necessarily taken measures to prevent such disciplinary problems”).
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educational institutions and administrations with the hiring discretion that
they require to maximize their students’ educational opportunities.
Initially, it should be highlighted that many of the gains made by students
through role-modeling are not quantifiable in terms of academic gains.
Role-modeling, as a concept, serves primarily to provide students with an
exemplar for them to mirror; copying teacher mindsets and habits primarily
deals with intangible characteristics. However, it is not as if an educator
teaches a class well and, in turn, the students, in viewing him or her as a
role model, then automatically begin to learn well. The students do not
replicate a carbon copy of the teacher’s successful actions. It is the
mindsets and habits, not the success, that the students are mirroring. 196
Therefore, it is possible that many of the gains made by students through
role-modeling, by learning to mirror their teacher’s habits and traits, would
improve in many ways that may not ultimately yield quantifiable outcomes.
However, many of the characteristics that teachers model for their students,
such as perseverance, method, and adaptability, could – and do –
eventually lead to student emulation and, ultimately, academic
achievement. 197
Research has shown that a teacher’s role in a student’s life is one of
the greatest factors in determining their academic success. 198 Both
common sense and empirical research have illustrated that the achievement
of students can vary widely depending on the assignment of their teacher. 199
With the United States slipping in the world educational rankings for both
language and math, 200 researchers should examine the root causes and
196. See Anthony F. Grasha, A Matter of Style: The Teacher as Expert, Formal
Authority, Personal Model, Facilitator, and Delegator, COLLEGE TEACHING, Fall 1994, at
142 (discussing the variety of styles employed by teachers).
197. Martin & Dowson, supra note 188 at 331.
198. See GEORGE D. KUH, ET. AL., WHAT MATTERS TO STUDENT SUCCESS: A REVIEW OF
THE LITERATURE 34 (2006) (“[v]irtually everyone agrees that student-faculty interaction is
an important factor in student success”).
199. See, e.g., Andrew J. Wayne & Peter Youngs, Teacher Characteristics and Student
Achievement Gains: A Review, REV. OF EDUC. RES., Spring 2003, at 89, 101 [hereinafter
Wayne & Youngs] (noting that while research is mixed, there is evidence that shows that
years of teaching experience, the selectivity of undergraduate institution, teachers’ test
scores, and regular licensure are associated with higher student achievement); Jonah E.
Rockoff, The Impact of Individual Teachers on Student Achievement: Evidence from Panel
Data, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 247, 251 (2004) (concluding that “teacher quality may be a key
instrument in improving student outcomes.”).
Cf. C. Kirabo Jackson, Student
Demographics, Teacher Sorting and Teacher Quality: Evidence From the End of School
Desegregation, 27 J. OF LAB. ECON. 213, 249 (2009) (discussing the decrease of quality
teachers in certain schools saw a diminished “teacher value added”).
200. Jessica Shepherd, World education rankings: which country does best at reading,
GUARDIAN,
Dec.
7,
2010,
10:43
PM,
maths
and
science?
THE
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/dec/07/world-education-rankings-maths-
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possible solutions for the decline. 201 Teachers, as the educational system’s
most fundamental resource, have received a large degree of attention. 202
While some reports have studied the quantity of teachers necessary to attain
a satisfactory education, others, recognizing the limited resources of the
public education system, have focused on the quality of teachers in an
attempt to divine what characteristics make an “effective” teacher. 203 This
research has produced a large body of results, some of which is conflicting,
and some of which is common sense. 204 However, there is a growing
consensus among all researchers that all systemic decisions that can be
made to increase the quality and impact of a teacher is crucial to the vitality
of the public education system in the United States 205
Research has found that one of the ways that teachers increase their
impact is tied closely to the concept of role-modeling. A number of studies
have found that teachers are more effective at teaching students who belong
to the same demographic group as them. 206 If students do in fact achieve at
a higher rate when they are being taught by an individual of the same
demographic group, it is worth highlighting the researchers’ explanation of
this phenomenon. Researchers have labeled the increase in academic
achievement by individuals when they are being taught by those of
matching demographics as the “role model” effect. 207 Commentators have
hypothesized that the “role model” effect of teachers exists for a variety of
reasons, stemming from the biases and archetypes of both the students and
the teachers. 208 The broadest and most elusive explanation involves what

science-reading.
201. Greg Palkot, American high school students slip in global education rankings,
FOX NEWS, Dec. 3, 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/12/03/american-highschool-students-slip-in-global-education-rankings/.
202. See Wayne & Youngs, supra note 199 at 89 (discussing how policy makers and
researchers continue to focus on teachers as a way of improving education).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 101.
205. Id. at 89-90.
206. See, e.g., Lucia A. Nixon & Michael D. Robinson, The Educational Attainment of
Young Women: Role Model Effects of Female High School Faculty, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 185,
192 (1999) [hereinafter Nixon & Robinson] (finding that the empirical data of student
success supported their hypothesis that “female faculty in high school provide role models
for young women”).
207. Dee, supra note 187. See generally, Eva Pereira, The Role Model Effect: Women
Leaders Key to Inspiring The Next Generation, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2012, 6:19 PM)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/worldviews/2012/01/19/the-role-model-effect-women-leaderskey-to-inspiring-the-next-generation/ (noting how the girls set higher goals for themselves
in certain regions where there was female politicians and attributing this to a “role-model
effect”).
208. Thomas S. Dee, A Teacher Like Me: Does Race, Ethnicity, or Gender Matter? 95
AM. ECON. REV. 158, 159 (2005).
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researchers call “passive” teacher effects. 209 Passive teacher effects are
triggered by a teacher’s demographics, including his/her gender, racial, or
ethnic identities, as opposed to his or her actions or behaviors. 210
Researchers have found that the “presence of a demographically similar
teacher raises a student’s academic motivation and expectations.” 211 An
additional phenomenon, which researchers have labeled the “stereotype
threat,” is the converse of the “role-modeling” effect. 212 In cases of
“stereotype threat,” students with differing identities from their teacher
adopt a stereotypical view of that teacher, assuming that the teacher holds
biases against them. 213 As a result, the student lowers their academic
aspirations and achievement. 214 Finally, other research has highlighted that
students are not the only actors in the educational environment and often,
the teachers’ own biases and archetypes can impact the educational
environment of a student who belongs to a different demographic
background. 215 For example, in his 2005 study, Dee demonstrated that
“[t]he odds that a student was perceived as inattentive or disruptive are
respectively at least nineteen and thirty-seven percent higher when the
teacher is of the opposite gender.” 216 Consequently, it appears that both the
teachers and students, in perceiving one another and reacting negatively to
those with differing identities while positively reacting to similar
individuals, reciprocally impact achievement in the classroom.
This brings us to the central question: would a same-sex hiring BFOQ
have an impact on student achievement gains? To answer this question, it
is important to inquire into studies that examine whether students whose
gender matches the teacher’s gender achieve at a higher rate. Due to the
recent scrutiny on teacher success and effectiveness, a variety of studies
have inspected the demographics of successful and unsuccessful teachers,
while only a limited number have measured the achievement impact of
gender matching between students and teachers. 217 The few studies that
have addressed the demographic interactions between students and teachers
have been based upon localized studies with small sample sizes in very

209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype threat and the intellectual test
performance of African Americans, 69 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995).
213. Id.
214. Dee, supra note 208.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 162.
217. Mark O. Evans, An Estimate of Race and Gender Role-Model Effects in Teaching
High School, 23 J. OF ECON. EDUC. 209, (1992).
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narrow conditions. 218 In the mid-1990s, a number of studies measured
student-achievement against a variety of variables, including mutual gender
identification with their teachers. 219 To a large degree, these studies were
uncontrolled, broad in their scope, and conflicting in their results. 220 More
recently, researchers have narrowed the scope of the tests and have found
that the results “clearly indicate that exposure to female faculty and
professional staff in [education] has a significant positive effect on the
educational attainment of young women . . . .” 221 A variety of studies have
found similar results, recognizing that female students taught by female
teachers are more likely to achieve academically. 222 The impact of the rolemodeling effects of male educators teaching male students has received
considerably less attention. 223 However, Thomas Dee, one of the preeminent researches in gender concordance in the educational sphere,
bluntly summarized his years of data: “[s]imply put, girls have better
educational outcomes when taught by women, and boys are better off when
taught by men.” 224
D. How the Role-Modeling BFOQ Would Be Applied in Education
The obvious questions surrounding the application of a same-sex rolemodeling BFOQ in the educational environment is how and where it will
be applied. Some schools have utilized student-focused programs, which
are designed to negate the student’s stereotype threat of their teachers by
teaching the students about diversity, as an effective way to overcome
teacher-demographic barriers. 225 Yet, ultimately, even if this plan were to
be effective, the program would still fail if the root-problem were not a

218. Dee, supra note 208.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Nixon & Robinson, supra note 206 at 189. A study of the National Education
Longitudinal Study of 1988 illustrated that female students achieved at a higher rate when
taught by female teachers, while male students underperformed. Thomas S. Dee, Teachers
and the Gender Gaps in Student Achievement, 42 J. OF HUM. RESOURCES 528, 546 (2007).
222. Speizer, supra note 166 at 697 (noting that study showed that “gifted high school
girls in accelerated math courses are likely to achieve at a math level if the course is taught
by a woman in an all-girls class or in a class where there are at least a sizable . . . . number
of girls relative to that of boys”).
223. Patricia Bricheno & Mary Thornton, Role model, hero or champion? Children’s
views concerning role models, 49 EDUC. RES. 383, 394 (2007).
224. Thomas S. Dee, The Why Chromosome, EDUC. NEXT, Fall 2006, at 69, 71.
225. See, e.g., CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON GIRLS AT THE LAUREL SCHOOL SHIELDING
STUDENTS
FROM
STEREOTYPE
THREAT
–
A
GUIDE
FOR
TEACHERS,
https://www.laurelschool.org/about/documents/stereotypeTHREAT.pdf (discussing The
Laurel School’s approach and thoughts on the stereotype threat).
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result of passive student stereotyping but as a result of the teacher’s
biases. 226 Similarly, if the stereotype-threat ultimately is the underlying
cause, certain teacher training will not impact the student biases. 227
Therefore, only comprehensive bias and archetype training that aim to
change the viewpoints of both students and teachers will sweepingly
impact the potential problem. Yet, the feasibility of a plan of this nature is
questionable. Educators are already stretched for time in a school day and
are unlikely to be receptive to plans that could instead be spent preparing
students for crucial standardized tests or to plans that seek to change
viewpoints that the teachers do not believe that they hold.
Consequently, the most feasible and effective program would not
ameliorate the underlying biases of the teachers and students, but would
rather embrace the positive effects that the demographic overlap of students
and teachers can have on the educational process and rather attempt to
align the demographics. Predictably, schools of different sizes will have
different demographic make-ups. However, overall, the schools will not be
single sex. When courts have recognized the same-sex role-modeling
BFOQ, it has largely been in employment scenarios where the gender of
the youth clientele has been singular – either male or female. 228 While
some of the cases considered by the lower courts involved mixed-gender
clientele, the flexibility of the employer’s workforce generally allowed the
employer’s policy to gender-match between the employees and the
clientele. 229 However, some circumstances have established the necessity
of a role-modeling BFOQ, even when the gender of the clientele was not
unitary. In Leggett v. Milwaukee County, the court acknowledged the
necessity of a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ for male guards even though
there was a female inmate population. 230 Therefore, it would not be
unprecedented for educational employers to utilize a role-modeling samesex BFOQ despite the mixed-gender of its student population.
Ultimately, the application of a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ in
education could come in two forms. First, educational employers could

226. Dee, supra note 208 at 164.
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., Leggett v. Milwaukee Cnty., 04-C-422, 2006 WL 3289371 at *3 (E.D.
Wis. Nov. 8, 2006) (approving a same-sex role modeling BFOQ for a predominantly male
juvenile center).
229. See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132-33 (3d Cir.
1996) (illustrating that an employer that had both male and female clientele could assign
gender-specific employees as it was not necessary to have an entirely male or female
population, as long as it was sufficient to support the role-modeling objective of the
business).
230. Leggett, 2006 WL 3289371 at *2 (finding it necessary to have gender balance that
promotes the role-modeling of its mostly male inmate population).
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argue that a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ is necessary to correct a
gender-imbalance in the teacher population of the school and should aim to
be as close to even as possible. Thomas Dee writes that “[o]ne clear
benefit of this approach is that it does not require a clear understanding of
the extent to which the effects documented . . . are driven by passive
responses (e.g., role-model effects and stereotype threat) or active biases in
student or teacher behaviors.” 231 However, Dee correctly notes that
maintaining an equally balanced teacher force would have the “unintended
and undesirable” consequences of possibly setting back students who did
not match the traits of the teachers. 232 Consequently, if a school is sixty
percent female, strictly maintaining a perfectly equal gender balance may
not be an economically purposeful use of the school district’s money.
Comparatively, a second approach suggests that educational
employers apply a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ that would be reflective
of the gender demographics of their students. As with the prison
population in Leggett, employers could argue that, in order to appropriately
maintain the necessary level of role-models for the students, the
employment of gender role-models should be proportionate to the student
demographics.
In its application, the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ would likely
utilize a form of the Leggett proportion-based approach. This standard
would allow a school district to argue that it possesses a sex-based BFOQ
when, due to an imbalance in the gender of hired teachers as compared to
the gender of the student population, the employer necessarily would need
to hire an individual of a specific gender in order to promote its rolemodeling objective. Although this may seem like an unworkable standard
because any discrepancy in the student demographics and the
demographics of the teachers would create a viable cause of action, this is
not necessarily the case. In disparate treatment cases, courts already
compare the demographics of one group, the employed teacher population
for example, to the demographics of another appropriate group, qualified
teachers in the relevant teacher market. 233 The standard employed in
Hazelwood, which requires a statistical disparity sufficiently substantial to
raise such an inference of causation, 234 is flexible enough to prevent a flood
of litigation. Therefore, in comparing the gender demographics of the
student population and the gender demographics of its teacher populations,

231. Dee, supra note 208 at 164.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 310-311 (1977)
(holding that comparing demographics of the employed teacher population to the
demographics of qualified teachers in the relevant labor market is appropriate).
234. Id. at 309.
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courts could import the same standard and only find a valid same-sex
BFOQ when there are discrepancies in the proportions of student and
teacher demographics are sufficiently substantial to raise a concern for the
effectiveness of the school’s ability to provide adequate same-gender rolemodels.
Taken in the abstract, the difference between the two possible policies,
one that aims for an even gender split and one that is reflective of the
student demographic population, appears to be of little significance. If the
gender split of the student population is even, then there is no tangible
difference between the policies, because in either case, the district’s goal
will be to maintain a teacher workforce that maintains gender balance.
However, research shows that the gender demographics of students vary
depending upon the educational placement of the student and the type of
school placement. 235 In one Maryland school in 2011, the female
population of the twelfth grade was nearly double that of the male
population. 236 Many researchers have highlighted the need for male
teachers in urban schools who could serve as role-models for the male
students. 237 One study by the Council of the Great City Schools noted that
in the early 1990s, “there was one male teacher for every [thirty-four] male
students in urban schools, while there was one female teacher for every
12.3 female students.” 238 Additional research shows that single-sex
education in inner-city schools is effective at reversing trends of black male
underperformance and, in the spirit of experimentation against a backdrop
of failure, an increasing number of schools are attempting to define
classrooms based upon gender concentration. 239 In these instances of large
235. See, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION: GAPS IN ACCESS AND
PERSISTENCE STUDY 42 (2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012046.pdf
(illustrating that males are almost twice as likely to be in a special education placement,
whereas females are more likely to be in a charter school); NATHANIAL S. HOSLEY, SURVEY
AND ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS 8 (showing that in a survey of
alternative education programs in Pennsylvania the student gender breakdown was seventy
percent male and thirty percent female).
236. See, e.g., National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core Data
http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/schoolsearch/school_detail.asp?Search=1&InstName=Coppin&Schoo
lType=1&SchoolType=2&SchoolType=3&SchoolType=4&SpecificSchlTypes=all&IncGra
de=-1&LoGrade=-1&HiGrade=-1&ID=240009001530 (last visited May 13, 2014) (showing
that there were 144 males enrolled compared to 212 females at Coppin Academy).
237. Inner-City Single-Sex Schools: Educational Reform or Invidious Discrimination?,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1741, 1744 (1992). See also LAURA LIPPMAN, ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER
FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, URBAN SCHOOLS: THE CHALLENGE OF LOCATION AND POVERTY
92 (1996) [hereinafter Lippman] (stating the need to recruit male teachers who could serve
as role models for male students).
238. Lippman, supra note 237 at 92.
239. Kusum Singh, et al., Single-Sex Classes and Academic Achievement in Two InnerCity Schools, 67 J. OF NEGRO EDUC. 157 (1998). See also Sharon K. Mollman, The Gender
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degrees of gender disparity, employers should be able to correct the
imbalance of teacher gender-ratio to reflect the student population by
promoting role-modeling, and thus, achievement of their students.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hazelwood School District v. United
States properly rejected the district court’s consideration of student
demographics when considering them in the context of a disparate
treatment case. 240 Yet the district court’s consideration of student
demographics in the context of educational hiring practices was not
completely mistaken. The Supreme Court decisions that have interpreted
the same-sex BFOQ exception to the Title VII requirement against
discrimination have provided that when gender is part of the “essence” of a
position, employers may validly discriminate on the basis of gender when
making employment decisions. While the Supreme Court has maintained
that this exception is narrow, the lower courts have expanded its
application to a variety of occupational contexts that establish the
appropriateness of gender-based hiring practices when the employer’s
third-party clients have privacy interests, physical safety interests, or
rehabilitative interests that would be jeopardized by a non-discriminatory
hiring practice.
More elusively, at the nexus of these three protected interests, the
lower courts have recognized a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ, which
provides that discriminatory gender hiring practices may be necessary in
order to promote the positive role-modeling of youth clients. However, the
lower courts’ limited application of the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ to
occupational circumstances where it is in combination with the other
BFOQs is logically inconsistent with the overarching statutory
requirements of the exception. Consequently, the primacy given to the
role-modeling BFOQ in certain applications, as well as its necessity as part
of the “essence” of a variety of occupations, establishes that the same-sex
role-modeling BFOQ should be a standalone exception, which does not
need to lie in combination with other BFOQs in order to defend a
discriminatory hiring practice.
The policy implications of a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ could
have an overwhelmingly positive impact on the educational system in the
United States. Role-modeling has been a consideration in the U.S.

Gap: Separating the Sexes in Public Education, 68 IND. L.J. 149, 161 (1992) (discussing the
importance of education in promoting gender equality).
240. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).

HOERNER_FINAL (ARTICLE 6).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

THE ROLE-MODELING BFOQ

8/28/2014 2:49 PM

1257

educational system since its inception and courts, including the Supreme
Court, have recognized that educators provide a model that students look to
emulate and replicate. As a result of the biases and archetypes that both
students and teachers bring into the classroom, research illustrates that
students achieve at a higher rate when they are being instructed by an
educator of demographic convergence. Research also demonstrates that
students, by viewing individuals of their gender in leadership and socially
successful roles, receive a boost in academic performance as they attempt
to mirror the intangible traits of their role model. Consequently, in schools
where there is a large gender disparity in classrooms and grade levels, a
gender-based role-modeling BFOQ would allow school districts to hire
individuals to reflect the characteristics of the student body. This approach
would provide a proportionate number of gender-based role-models for the
students that boost their success through the passive effects of rolemodeling. The degree to which a role-modeling BFOQ would impact the
educational system is unclear. However, given the number of failing
schools that have large gender disparities in its student and teacher
populations, role-modeling BFOQ seems to be an effective method to
combat the trend of student dropouts and academic underperformance in
these schools. Indeed, it is a strong step in the right direction as it speaks
directly to the essence of the mission of education.
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